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The Making of the Clean Air Act 
BRIGHAM DANIELS,† ANDREW P. FOLLETT,† & JOSHUA DAVIS† 
The 1970 Clean Air Act is arguably Congress’ most important environmental enactment. Since it 
became law fifty years ago, much could be and has been said about how it has changed both the 
physical environment and the contours of environmental law. Much less, however, has been 
written on the genesis of the Act itself. Where its history is discussed, it is often segmented or 
heavily summarized.  
In this Article, we take on the story of how the Act came to be as well as how early enforcement 
practices cemented its importance in the legal landscape. To do so, we rely upon an 
unprecedented analysis and synthesis of previously underexplored strands of the story, 
incorporating many unmined sources and original research. This story weaves together the 
contributions of officials and staff in the Nixon Administration, Congress, and the judiciary to 
provide what is hoped to be an integrated, meaningful, and readable account of the making of the 
Clean Air Act. 
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Article are the product of nearly eight years of his original research. The primary and secondary sources Daniels 
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INTRODUCTION 
Fifty years ago, as the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments passed through 
Congress, Senator Eugene McCarthy captured the progressive spirit of the era 
when he stated that clean air seemed to represent “an issue that’s better than 
motherhood.”1 Indeed in 1970, the environment as a whole was “the golden 
child, the exclusive and favorite national concern.”2 One polemic from the era 
opined that “the businessman-industrialist awaits in frightened expectation; the 
activist-conservationist in childlike frenetic excitation.”3 In fact, White House 
polling data from the period reveals that environmental protection was one of 
the biggest concerns on the minds of the American people, only trailing behind 
the Vietnam War and the state of the economy.4 
Air pollution, the budding environmental movement’s “God and 
motherhood”5 issue, was front and center, and the legislation process of the 
Clean Air Act (“the Act”) best captured the bipartisan zeitgeist and political 
urgency of the time. It is hard to overstate how important the passage of the 
Clean Air Act has been for the evolution of environmental law—before the 
Clean Air Act, environmental law as we know it today was hardly a recognized 
discipline of study.6 In fact, nothing that could be characterized as meaningful 
pollution-control law by modern standards could be found in U.S. Code before 
1970.7 Congress crafted and put to the test many of the most innovative aspects 
of U.S. environmental law, several of which would later be replicated in the suite 
of laws that would come to comprise the core of American environmental law.8 
 
 1. Memorandum from Leon Billings, former Staff Dir., U.S. Senate Env’t Subcomm., to Personal Files 1 
(on file with authors as Muskie 1–15). 
 2. RUSSELL E. TRAIN, POLITICS, POLLUTION, AND PANDAS: AN ENVIRONMENTAL MEMOIR 201 (2003) 
(quoting Linda Ba Thung, an environmental reporter).  
 3. Joseph H. Thibodeau, Michigan’s Environmental Protection Act of 1970: Panacea or Pandora’s Box, 
48 J. URB. L. 579, 598 (1971). 
 4. Memorandum from John C. Whitaker, former Member, Domestic Policy Council, to President Richard 
Nixon (June 29, 1971) (on file with authors as Nixon 2-70) (including polling data from Benham poll). 
 5. Editorial, Environment in Politics, SARASOTA (FLA.) HERALD-TRIB. (on file with authors as Nixon 4-
16). 
 6. James L. Huffman, The Past and Future of Environmental Law, 30 ENVTL. L. 23, 27–28 (2000) 
(explaining that the first environmental law journal was not introduced until 1969 at Lewis and Clark, and that 
it took about a decade before environmental law was generally offered across the country); Richard J. Lazarus, 
Environmental Scholarship and the Harvard Difference, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 327, 341 (1999) 
(“Environmental law did not emerge as a distinct category of legal scholarship until approximately 1973.”); J.B. 
Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change Meets the Law of the Horse, 62 DUKE L.J. 975, 982 (2013) (“The very 
term ‘environmental law’ did not even exist before 1969.”). 
 7. Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An Inquiry in Legal Taxonomy, 95 CORNELL 
L. REV. 221, 223 n.2 (“The first major federal environmental case, Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. 
Federal Power Commission, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), was decided in 1965. The first modern federal 
environmental statute, the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370f (2006), was 
signed into law on January 1, 1970.”). 
 8. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 79–84 (2004) (calling the 1970s a “new 
era” for environmental protection and detailing numerous legal innovations that emerged during that time); 
Daniel Riesel, Forecasting Significant Air Act Implementation Issues: Permitting and Enforcement, 14 
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Although environmental protection would not retain its untouchable 
political popularity for long,9 the legacy of the Clean Air Act is difficult to 
overstate; it has demonstrably altered the chemical and material composition of 
American air, particularly in heavily populated urban areas.10 These gains are 
more than blue skies—clean air has spared many, especially in historically 
marginalized communities, from illness and premature death.11 The Clean Air 
Act, including through later rounds of amendments,12 has been a primary tool 
used by the United States to combat acid rain,13 and, in the last decade, has been 
seen by many, including the Obama Administration, as a potential tool for 
regulating carbon emissions in response to global climate change.14  
We echo the assertion of Senator John Sherman Cooper, who helped author 
the Act, that the Clean Air Act may be among the “most significant measure[s] 
in the domestic sense of legislation in any congress.”15 Its importance justifies 
this golden-anniversary investigation into its genesis and the people who have 
made it. In this Article, we argue that the content and legacy of the Clean Air 
 
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 129, 129 (1996) (“The Clean Air Act (CAA) was the original or flagship statute of the 
1970 environmental revolution. All environmental statutes subsequent and prior to the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) are closely based on the 1970 CAA 
pattern.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Bruce M. Kramer, The 1970 Clean Air Amendments: Federalism in 
Action or Inaction?, 6 TEX. TECH L. REV. 47, 47 (1974) (“The Clean Air Act, as it now stands, is a pioneering 
document that reflects tremendous credit on the skill, wisdom and foresight of its draftsmen. However, as a 
pioneering document, it incorporates many previously untested provisions” (quoting Arthur C. Stern, 
Strengthening the Clean Air Act, J. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ASS’N, 1019, 1020 (1973)).  
 9. See infra Subpart IV.B. 
 10. See, e.g., Michael Greenstone, Estimating Regulation-Induced Substitution: The Effect of the Clean Air 
Act on Water and Ground Pollution, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 442, 443–47 (2003). 
 11. See, e.g., Kimberly M. Castle & Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Standards, Thresholds, and the 
Next Battleground of Climate Change Regulations, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1349, 1394 (2019); Samuel J. Rascoff & 
Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis: Towards Parity in Environmental and Health-and-
Safety Regulation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1763, 1766 (2002). 
 12. See generally Adam Babich, Back to the Basics of Antipollution Law, 32 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2018) 
(discussing the 1977 and 1990 amendments); Samuel Hays, Clean Air: From the 1970 Act to the 1977 
Amendments, 17 DUQ. L. REV. 33 (1977) (same); David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statues: The Case 
of the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L. REV. 740 (1983) (discussing the 1977 Amendments extensively); Henry A. 
Waxman, An Overview of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 21 ENVTL. L. 1721 (1991) (discussing the 
1990 amendments).  
 13. See, e.g., JAMES L. REGENS & ROBERT W. RYCROFT, THE ACID RAIN CONTROVERSY (2d prtg.1989); 
Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 982 (1997); Brennan Van 
Dyke, Emissions Trading to Reduce Acid Deposition, 100 YALE L.J. 2707, 2708 n.9 (1991). 
 14. See, e.g., Castle & Revesz, supra note 11, at 1350; Howard M. Crystal et al., Returning to Clean Air 
Act Fundamentals: A Renewed Call to Regulate Greenhouse Gases Under the National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (NAAQS) Program, 31 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 233, 284–85 (2019); Holly Doremus & W. Michael 
Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the Clean Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism Framework Is Useful 
for Addressing Global Warming, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 799, 800 (2008); Christopher T. Giovinazzo, Defending 
Overstatement: The Symbolic Clean Air Act and Carbon Dioxide, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 99, 100 (2006); 
Craig N. Oren, Is the Clean Air Act at a Crossroads?, 40 ENVTL. L. 1231, 1249–54 (2010); Craig N. Oren, When 
Must EPA Set Ambient Air Quality Standards? Looking Back at NRDC v. Train, 30 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
157, 157–58 (2012); Nathan Richardson, Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act: Does Chevron 
Set the EPA Free?, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 283, 284 (2010). 
 15. A Bill to Amend the Clean Air Act and for Other Purposes: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Pub. 
Works, Exec. Sess. 491 (Sept. 11, 1970) (statement of Sen. John Sherman Cooper). 
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Act can be fully appreciated only when supplemented with an understanding of 
the political context and key players behind it. The story of the passage of the 
Act would likely surprise even well-informed students of environmental legal 
history: many of its most important provisions were the product of tobacco-
smoke-filled, closed-door deliberations filled primarily with decided non-
environmentalists. In fact, some of its most significant innovations, such as 
national standards, came from the conservative Nixon Administration itself. 
Furthermore, the dedicated early enforcement of the Act, which made it 
legitimate and lasting, came by the hands of Nixon-appointees.  
While there are some notable pieces of writing which deal with the Clean 
Air Act’s making (a brief history is often offered when the Act is analyzed),16 
the focus of existing literature rests on practical effects of the law and the 
regulatory tools it created. Thus, the “told story,” which this Article 
supplements, is an admittedly short tale.17  
The highlights of the “told story” are as follows: In the late 1960s and early 
1970s, a number of factors made environmental issues politically salient, 
including the first Earth Day, the popularity of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, 
and various environmental disasters.18 Congress responded to this pressure by 
trying to further environmental legislation, including revamping existing federal 
pollution law.19 In 1970, President Nixon, driven by politics, attempted to claim 
a share of the spotlight by calling on Congress to craft even more aggressive and 
comprehensive environmental laws, including an improved Clean Air Act.20 
 
 16. See generally CHRISTOPHER J. BAILEY, CONGRESS AND AIR POLLUTION: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES IN 
THE USA (1998); J. BROOKS FLIPPEN, NIXON AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2000); LAZARUS, supra note 8; R. SHEP 
MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (1983); E. Donald Elliott et al., 
Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313 
(1985); Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2014); Richard 
J. Lazarus, Senator Edmund Muskies’s Enduring Legacy in the Courts, 67 ME. L. REV. 240 (2015); Robert V. 
Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141 (1995); 
Joseph L. Sax, Environmental Law at the Turn of the Century: A Reportorial Fragment of Contemporary 
History, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2375 (2000); Russell E. Train, The Environmental Record of the Nixon 
Administration, 26 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 185 (1996); McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive 
Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 29–31 (1994); Craig N. Oren, 
Clearing the Air: The McCubbins-Noll-Weingast Hypothesis and the Clean Air Act, 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 45, 80–
97 (1989). 
 17. We use the description of the “told story” in a descriptive and not in a derogatory way; each element 
of the told story is true, descriptive, and meaningful. We recognize that much that has been told was untold 
before it was written. Our hope is that this Article will likewise find a home in the “told story” and serve as 
platform for others build upon. 
 18. Huffman, supra note 6, at 24 (“Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring was a key catalyst for widespread public 
concern about the health impacts of various human activities.”). 
 19. Elliot et al., supra note 16, at 321 (noting the complex, “more subtle,” and decentralized sort of 
influence the grassroots movement exerted on policymaking institutions, while still recognizing the practical 
effects of such mass-movement pressure). 
 20. See FLIPPEN, supra note 16, at 76–77; LAZARUS, supra note 8; Elliot et al., supra note 16, at 324, 333–
39 (suggesting that Muskie and President Nixon were caught in a “politicians’ dilemma,” where passage of the 
Clean Air Act of 1970 took “a form which was more stringent than either of them would have preferred” as a 
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Senator Muskie, propelled by presidential ambitions, upped the ante again by 
pushing through Congress the remarkably comprehensive 1970 Clean Air Act 
Amendments.21  
One deterrent to expanding beyond these key elements of the told story is 
undoubtedly the Act’s inherent complexity. In overcoming this barrier, this 
Article takes advantage of the passage of the last half-century, retrospectively 
identifying the most critical aspects of the law and, in turn, telling the story of 
the making of these portions of the Act, including those provisions which have 
demonstrated the greatest effects on both air quality and environmental law. 
Because we want to recount and analyze the Act’s history in a comprehensive 
and readable way, we blend the told story with previously underexplored 
perspectives, many growing out of unpublished primary sources and original 
research.  
First, in Part I, we explore the political environment of the Clean Air Act, 
including the beginnings of the environmental movement in general and the 
active, and at-times unappreciated, role that the Nixon White House had in 
shaping the early Clean Air Act. We set the scene for the 1970 environmental 
thrust by outlining how the environment became the “God and motherhood 
issue,” and how it was adopted by Nixon despite mixed opinions from various 
members of his Administration, including the President himself. In particular, 
we note the significant role the Administration played in coaxing a strong, 
federal Clean Air Act from Congress and how its proposals affected the 
trajectory of the bill. 
Part II explores the legislative process of the Clean Air Act, focusing 
primarily on the Senate, in order to demonstrate how key players in the Air and 
Water Pollution Subcommittee transformed earlier air pollution legislation by 
incorporating novel policy tools. Specific actions taken by Chair Edmund 
Muskie illuminate and justify the generally accepted claim that Muskie was the 
primary mover of the bill. More significantly, however, while still recognizing 
Muskie’s primary role in the legislation, we tease out the undervalued role and 
contributions of other members of the Public Works Committee and Air and 
Water Pollution Subcommittee. We pay particular focus to the genesis of 
 
result of a kind of “policy escalation”), quoted in Robert F. Blohmquist, “To Stir Up Public Interest”: Edmund 
S. Muskie and the U.S. Senate Special Subcommittee’s Water Pollution Investigations and Legislative Activities, 
1963–66—A Case Study in Early Congressional Environmental Policy Development, 22 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
1, 13 n.42 (1997); Joel K. Goldstein, Edmund S. Muskie: The Environmental Leader and Champion, 67 ME. L. 
REV. 226, 226 (2015); Robert Gottlieb, The Next Environmentalism: How Movements Respond to the Changes 
that Elections Bring—From Nixon to Obama, 14 ENVTL. HIST. 298, 302 (2009); Alfred Marcus, Environmental 
Protection Agency, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 267, 267–68 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980); David Vogel, A 
Big Agenda, 11 WILSON Q. 50, 57–58 (1987). 
 21. See Elliott et al., supra note 16, cited in David Gerard & Lester B. Lave, Implementing Technology-
Forcing Policies: The 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments and the Introduction of Advanced Automotive Emissions 
Controls in the United States, 72 TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 761, 766 (2005). Muskie is 
often, but not always, credited alone. For exceptions, see Leon G. Billings, Edmund S. Muskie: A Man with a 
Vision, 67 ME. L. REV. 234, 235 (2015). 
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technology forcing (composed of statutory deadlines and standards), shared 
federalism, citizen suits, and mandatory performance by government agencies.  
In Part III, we build on the explorations of Part II as the story of the Clean 
Air Act continues through conference committee and its signing, which is 
highlighted by a power struggle between Senator Muskie and President Nixon. 
This Part complements the building narrative of the earlier legislative process 
and creates a through-line to the period of the early Environmental Protection 
Agency’s regulatory programs. 
Part IV continues into the early enforcement era (reaching the first years of 
the Ford Administration) and argues that key decisions made by early EPA 
Administrators William Ruckelshaus and Russell Train, sometimes upon the 
intervention of the courts (and usually with constant congressional oversight), 
were crucial in defining the efficacy and trajectory of the Clean Air Act. Thus, 
Part IV extends our analysis outside of the Congress and considers the Act as it 
exists today as the product of all branches of government. 
I.  NIXON RESPONDS TO POPULAR DEMAND FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 
This Part details the rise to prominence of the environment as a political 
issue, as well as President Richard Nixon’s response and actions, which we 
recognize were driven largely by political necessity. Gradual momentum for 
political change on the environmental front began more than a decade before the 
passage of the Clean Air Act and greatly accelerated in the last years of the 
1960s.22 Congress began flirting with federalizing air pollution control as early 
as 1955 in the form of the inaptly named Air Pollution Control Act (“the 
APCA”).23 Although an important first step for Congress, the two-page APCA 
was extremely modest in scope. Rather than focus on regulation or the control 
of air pollution per se, the Act attempted to facilitate research, develop future 
technical means to reduce pollution, collect data, disseminate research findings, 
and offer assistance to states that volunteered to do something about local air 
pollution.24 Ultimately, the APCA lacked any language to affirmatively compel 
governmental action on air pollution.25  
 
 22. Goldstein, supra note 20, at 27; Gottlieb, supra note 20, at 301. 
 23. Air Pollution Control Act, Pub. L No. 159-360, 69 Stat. 322 (1955). 
 24. Id. at 322–23, §§ 3–5; see also CLAYTON D. FORSWALL & KATHRYN E. HIGGINS, ENVTL. AND ENERGY 
SYS. INST., CLEAN AIR ACT IMPLEMENTATION IN HOUSTON: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 1970–2005, at 17 
(2005) (discussing how the EPA “promulgated its own plan to get Houston into attainment” when it determined 
that Texas’s state implementation plan would not meet the ozone standard). 
 25. 1 TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.03, Lexis Advance (database updated Oct. 2019). After all, 
even though this enactment did not have much in the way of “teeth,” so to speak, before any clean air statutes 
were formed, all that existed was the common law and some modest state statutes, most of them aimed at air 
pollution that created some statutorily defined nuisance. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24200–25946 
(1976) (repealed 1986); SCOTT HAMILTON DEWEY, DON’T BREATHE THE AIR: AIR POLLUTION AND U.S. 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS, 1945–1970 (2000). 
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In 1963, with Senator Ed Muskie now the first Chair of the Pollution 
Subcommittee, Congress took the APCA one step further by passing a federal 
Clean Air Act.26 This enactment provided the federal government a regulatory 
role in air pollution control for the first time, though it was a relatively minor 
role that the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW) exercised with great discretion.27 In particular, it authorized the 
regulation of federal stationary sources and accelerated research on the adverse 
health effects of air pollution.28 Like the 1955 enactment, it was rooted in a 
strong presumption of unchallenged state primacy on regulating air pollution.29 
The 1965 Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Act,30 which laid the foundation for 
the 1970 Clean Air Act’s Title II, broadened the scope of regulated pollutants 
and acknowledged the automobile’s place in the complex system of air pollution. 
To his credit, Muskie was early to the game of strong, dramatic air pollution 
legislation: as early as 1964 he described efforts to curb air pollution as a “war,” 
for example—language that wouldn’t become more mainstream until the 
following decade.31 
Muskie’s eagerness went unmatched in Congress, however,32 and it was 
not until the 1967 Air Quality Act that the nation-wide struggle against air 
pollution began “in earnest” in the eyes of Congress.33 The steps that this 
enactment took seem negligible in comparison with what would follow three 
years later; still, the 1967 Act succeeded in filling technical and knowledge gaps 
that earlier research-oriented bills sought (but ultimately failed) to fill. Similarly, 
although the Air Quality Act conformed to the pattern of previous amendments 
in incrementally deepening federal authority over air pollution, it maintained 
virtually unqualified state control of regulation and upheld variable standards in 
different regions of the country rather than a uniform national standard.34  
Shortly after the 1967 Act, however, the political atmosphere shifted 
dramatically, setting the stage for a period of punctuated evolution in the law, 
which would match Muskie’s rhetoric and legislative aspirations. The 
environment did not seize attention right away, however, because more 
immediate social issues were reaching their own boiling points: Civil Rights and 
 
 26. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963). It may be worth mentioning that this is the first 
Clean Air Act in name; thus, what we refer to as the Clean Air Act throughout this Article might be more fully 
referred to as the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments. 
 27. Id. § 5, 77 Stat. at 396–98. 
 28. Id. § 7(a), 77 Stat. at 399; id. § 3, 77 Stat. at 394–95. 
 29. See Id. § 4(a), 77 Stat. at 395; id. § 5(b), 77 Stat. at 396 (“[M]unicipal, State, and interstate action to 
abate air pollution shall be encouraged and shall not be displaced by Federal enforcement action except as 
otherwise provided”). 
 30. Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965). 
 31. 110 CONG. REC. 6261 (1964). 
 32. See infra Subpart II.B. 
 33. Clean Air Act Amendments: Hearings on the Air Quality Act of 1967 Before the House Comm. on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 204 (1967). 
 34. Robert Martin & Lloyd Symington, A Guide to the Air Quality Act of 1967, 33 LAW AND CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 239, 243 (1968).  
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anti-Vietnam protests, and the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr. and 
Robert Kennedy still dominated the national stage.35 Despite considerable 
movement in Congress, such as a Joint House-Senate Colloquium on the issue 
of the environment and a national environmental policy,36 the environment was 
not a widely recognizable or coherent political issue to the public, and was thus 
not a campaign issue for either party to any meaningful extent as late as the ‘68 
Presidential race.37  
Perhaps due to social unrest and public cynicism regarding the federal 
government, Congress began to coalesce in a bipartisan manner around many 
issues of public import,38 something that probably worked in favor in Congress 
addressing air pollution. The cooperation found in Congress stood in stark 
contrast to the whirlwind surrounding it—Washington, D.C. was the eye of a 
storm of unrest and divisiveness: the Senate and House Office Buildings, as well 
as the Capitol itself, were sandbagged, and much of the city was engulfed in 
riots.39 Protestors occupied government buildings and badgered congressional 
representatives for their failure to act meaningfully,40 and smoke from 
congressional representatives’ cigars competed for the air in the halls of the 
public congressional offices with that of demonstrators’ marijuana.41 
 
 35. For comprehensive discussions of the events of 1968, see MICHAEL A. COHEN, AMERICAN 
MAELSTROM: THE 1968 ELECTION AND THE POLITICS OF DIVISION (2016); LEWIS L. GOULD, 1968: THE 
ELECTION THAT CHANGED AMERICA (1993); MICHAEL NELSON, RESILIENT AMERICA: ELECTING NIXON IN 1968, 
CHANNELING DISSENT, AND DIVIDING GOVERNMENT (2014); DENNIS WAINSTOCK, ELECTION YEAR 1968: THE 
TURNING POINT (2012). 
 36. See Joint House-Senate Colloquium to Discuss a Nat’l Policy for the Environment: Hearing on Before 
the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs & H. Comm. on Sci. & Astronautics, 90th Cong. (1968) [hereinafter 
Joint House-Senate Colloquium]. 
 37. See FLIPPEN, supra note 16, at 19–20; Interview with Tom Jorling, former Minority Counsel, U.S. 
Senate Comm. on Pub. Works, in Saranac Lake, N.Y. (Sept. 21, 2018). It is worth noting that although the 
environment issue was not hotly contested, it was not totally absent, either. For example, Nixon, made a 
statement addressing potential efforts to improve the urban environment—many of which might be considered 
environmental initiatives. See Statement of Richard M. Nixon, Republican Presidential Nominee, Statement in 
Miami, Fl. (Oct. 13, 1968) (on file with authors as Nixon 2-120) (“[W]e have been promised rebirth of our 
cities—promised improved transportation, pure air, clean water, and safe, quiet streets. Billions of our tax dollars 
were spent trying to keep those promises. But they were not kept. Our air is still fouled by pollutants. Our rivers 
and lakes are still unclean. . . . All pollution in one form or another violates the rights of individuals. Everyone 
has the right to be protected from bodily harm by others. And every poisonous particle that lodges in our lungs, 
every pieces of trash that litters our streets, every jarring noise that assails our eardrums was caused by 
someone. . . . Up to now, those who pollute have been largely subsidized at the expense of our physical and 
mental health. This can no longer continue. . . . [B]y failing to respond earlier to the challenge posed by new 
technology—[government] has been a passive, condoning partner in the creation of polluted cities.”). 
 38. On the strong bipartisan effect, see Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation 
of Federal Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 323 (1991) (noting that the average vote in 
favor of federal environmental legislation during this decade was “seventy-six to five in the Senate and 331 to 
thirty in the House”). 
 39. See BEN W. GILBERT, TEN BLOCKS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE: ANATOMY OF THE WASHINGTON RIOTS 
OF 1968 (1968); Denise Kersten Wills, “People Were Out of Control”: Remembering the 1968 Riots, 
WASHINGTONIAN (Apr. 1, 2008), https://www.washingtonian.com/2008/04/01/people-were-out-of-control-
remembering-the-1968-riots/; Interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 37. 
 40. Interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 37. 
 41. Id. 
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This political climate acted as a catalyst to the developing grassroots 
environmental movement.42 Many members of Congress were eager to appease 
a growingly skeptical and divided public by demonstrating that they could 
effectively recognize and advance the public interest through flashy new 
legislative packages.  
Some members of Congress saw an opportunity enact tougher legislation 
on the environment, for example, seeking to atone for “a sad and frustrating 
history of weak-kneed inaction,” believing that they had “been charged with 
protecting the divine right of every citizen to breathe clean air.”43 A few months 
before movement on the Clean Air Act began, Senator Henry Jackson similarly 
justified the National Environmental Policy Act. A “primary purpose” of that 
Act, he said, “is to restore public confidence in the Federal Government’s 
capacity to achieve important public purposes and objectives and at the same 
time maintain and enhance the quality of the environment.”44  
Vietnam, civil rights, and Soviet tension may all have been out of reach, 
but cleaning the air seemed to be attainable, and gains could be measured and 
seen. But for this cynicism and distrust of the government, it is highly unlikely 
that the environmental movement itself, growing since the early 1960s, would 
have resulted in the strong iteration of the Clean Air Act which we now have.45 
At the turn of the decade, a perfect storm of events focused the nation’s attention 
on the problem of environmental quality in particular, channeling general unrest 
into new vessels of “ecology”: an unprecedented environmental disaster arising 
from the Santa Barbara oil spill.46 As the nation began to focus on the 
 
 42. Elliott, et al., supra note 16, at 321. 
 43. HOUSE CONSIDERATION OF THE REP. OF THE CONF. COMM., at 7 (Dec. 18, 1970), reprinted in 1 COMM. 
ON PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 116 (1974). 
 44. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, S. REP. NO. 91-296, at 8 (1969); see also 115 CONG. 
REC. 19,008 (1969) (covering the consideration of a bill amending the National Environmental Policy Act, which 
provides the purposes and policy goals of the Act).  
 45. Interview with Tom Jorling, former Minority Counsel, U.S. Senate Comm. on Pub. Works, in Provo, 
Utah (Feb. 11, 2019). But see Christopher D. Ahlers, Origins of the Clean Air Act: A New Interpretation, 45 
ENVTL. L. 75, 77–78 (2015) (arguing that the Clean Air Act arose not necessarily because of events of 1970 but 
rather due to a gradual, if not inevitable, evolution of federal air regulations from 1955 to 1970; in other words, 
arguing that the 1970 Act does not represent “punctuated evolution,” so to speak). 
 46. Leslie Carothers, Upholding EPA Regulation of Greenhouse Gases: The Precautionary Principle 
Redux, 41 ECOLOGY L.Q. 683, 717 (2014) (“When EPA’s health-based lead regulations were undergoing final 
interagency review in the fall of 1973, long lines were forming at service stations as a result of the Arab oil 
embargo following the Yom Kippur War. . . . As EPA Deputy Administrator John Quarles recalled in his 
firsthand account of EPA’s battle with White House staff in November 1973, one of the major lead processors 
ran full-page newspaper ads in the Washington Post and the New York Times claiming that the rules would waste 
one million barrels of oil per day. Although this wild claim was never substantiated, EPA agreed with the staff 
of the Office of Management and Budget to change the lead reduction schedule to reduce the first-year impacts 
and extend the final compliance date, while achieving a slightly greater level of total lead reduction.” (footnotes 
omitted)); Craig N. Oren, Comment, Struggling for Context: An Appraisal of “Struggling for Air,” 46 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10838, 10842 (2016) (“The Arab oil embargo of 1973 . . . . led to many states abandoning their 
ambitious goals for emission reduction” (footnote omitted)); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A Century of Air Pollution 
Control Law: What’s Worked; What’s Failed; What Might Work, 21 ENVTL. L. 1549, 1602 (1991) (“The 
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environment, more ecological problems, previously ignored, also became 
apparent.  
During this initial “honeymoon era” of the environment,47 as it would later 
be called by some in the Nixon White House, “pollution and ecology” enjoyed 
its widest base. Polling data from the period illustrate the transformation and 
show a degree of public support, which might seem unimaginable in a modern 
political atmosphere.  
In May 1971, just a few months after the Clean Air Act was signed, 
Opinion Research Corporation’s Tom Benham conducted a poll for internal use 
by the White House.48 The President’s adviser charged with heading up 
environmental policy, an environmentally-concerned Domestic Policy Council 
member named John Whitaker,49 wrote a memo to Nixon that cited this poll and 
tried to make a case that the President should try his hand in the environmental 
arena.  
Benham’s polling clearly demonstrates the prominence of air and water 
pollution as an issue, being designated “very important” by seventy-nine percent 
of respondents—up near the top or even higher than problems of combating 
crime, holding down inflation, or managing unemployment.50 Seventy-four 
percent of respondents said that government spending should be increased in 
response to air and water pollution—the second highest such rating.51 
Even more dramatically, the polling data revealed that seventy-seven 
percent of the public favored closing down any factory which “continually 
violates laws regulating pollution, and 88% of the public similarly favored heavy 
fines against companies who continually violate pollution control laws.”52 A 
strong plurality of Americans (forty-five percent) even went so far as to insist 
that sources of pollution be shut down even at the expense of the jobs of “many 
of their neighbors.”53 Set against a background of public ignorance just a few 
 
program to protect areas already having clean air was bogged down by EPA’s failure to implement the prevention 
of significant deterioration (PSD) program. At the same time, unemployment had grown to nine percent, there 
was double digit inflation, and the nation was struggling with the aftermath of the 1973 Arab oil embargo. It was 
in this context that Congress, in 1977, attempted to redirect EPA toward achieving the goals of the CAA” 
(footnote omitted).); Memorandum from Russell Train, former Admin., Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Robert P. Mayo, 
former Dir., Bureau of the Budget (Apr. 16, 1970) (on file with authors as Nixon 6-221) (“Serious students of 
the environmental movement agree that the Santa Barbara oil spill was the single incident that crystallized the 
amorphous concern for the environment into an international movement.”). 
 47. EDMUND S. MUSKIE, 92D CONG., REPORT ON S. SUBCOMM. ON AIR AND WATER POLLUTION ACTIVITY 
(1972) (on file with authors as Muskie 3-7). 
 48. Memorandum from John C. Whitaker, former Member, Domestic Policy Council, to President Richard 
Nixon (June 29, 1971) (on file with authors as Nixon 2-70) (including polling data from Benham poll). 
 49. Whitaker’s role in the Nixon-environment push in general is difficult to overstate, although tangential 
to the topic at hand and perhaps better left to other research reports. 
 50. Memorandum from Thomas W. Benham, former Executive Vice President, Opinion Research 
Corporation, to John C. Whitaker (June 22, 1971) (on file with authors as Nixon 2-72).  
 51. Memorandum from John C. Whitaker, supra note 48 (including polling data from Benham’s poll). 
 52. Id. at 3. 
 53. Memorandum from John C. Whitaker, former Member, Domestic Policy Council, to John D. 
Ehrlichman (July 29, 1971) (on file with authors as Nixon 2-76) (including polling data from Benham’s poll). 
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years prior (as well as partisan antipathy in the coming years),54 these polling 
figures were and remain today dramatic.55 
The broad appeal and political one-sidedness during this period thus 
illuminate Gene McCarthy’s characterization of clean air and the environment 
as an issue “that’s better than motherhood.”56 But Nixon had an additional 
reason to worry about pollution, one that is often cited by historians of the 
environmental movement—Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine—who was in 
significant part responsible for much of Congress’ early environmental 
enactments.57  
As a result, Muskie surged in popularity as a potential Democratic 
presidential candidate when the environment began to gain traction.58 As 
support for Muskie grew, so did Nixon’s interest in the environment 
reflexively.59 Muskie had earned the reputation as the Senate’s “Mr. Clean”60 
and, unlike the rigid “law and order” Nixon who presented himself as the 
political establishment’s response to insurgent counter-culture movements, 
Muskie could appeal to a disillusioned youth that formed a key voting 
constituency. Muskie was also later crucial in forcing “a commitment from the 
Nixon Administration that the Environmental Protection Agency would be an 
advocate, not an adjudicator, of environmental protection.”61 
In the last half of 1969, even as Senator Gaylord Nelson announced he 
would hold an Earth Day rally the following April (which would draw in nearly 
one in ten Americans), Nixon prepared to make a move of his own in 1970—an 
 
 54. See Leon G. Billings, former Staff Dir., U.S. Senate Env’t Subcomm., Keynote Address at the 75th 
Annual Meeting of the Missouri Water Environment Association (Mar. 22, 2004), 
http://www.muskiefoundation.org/leon.missouri.html (noting the way in which the partisan divide on the 
environment grew in the years following the passage of the Clean Air Act). 
 55. See Memorandum from John C. Whitaker, supra note 48. 
 56. Memorandum from Leon Billings supra note 1, at 1 (undated) (on file with authors as Muskie 1-15); 
Memorandum to Files, Violation of Title II of the Clean Air Act (Nov. 13, 1972) (on file with authors as Muskie 
1-51). A shift on the environment can also be demonstrated by shifting attitudes within the Administration on 
the enforcement of existing air legislation:  
In September of 1969, the Administration entered into a consent decree to settle a civil anti-trust [sic] 
suit against the auto companies for conspiring for more than a decade to thwart development of 
pollution control devices. During consideration of that suit, the Justice Department prepared a memo 
recommending criminal prosecution of auto executives for collusive efforts to thwart development 
of clean engine systems from 1953 through the late sixties. 
Id.  
 57. FLIPPEN, supra note 16, at 26–27; LAZARUS, supra note 8, at 76–78; John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of 
Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 242 (1990); Gottlieb supra note 20, at 302 (2009); Interview with 
Leon Billings, former Staff Dir., U.S. Senate Environment Subcomm., in Washington, D.C. (July 22, 2012) (on 
file with authors as Leon Billings D.C. Interview). 
 58. Louis Harris, Muskie Leads Nixon for ’72, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1970 (on file with authors as Muskie 
4-48); Muskie Leads Kennedy in ’72 Presidential Poll, BOS. GLOBE, June 11, 1970, at 3 (on file with authors as 
Muskie 4-3). 
 59. 1 HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., UNIV. TENN., CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y, CLEANING AMERICA’S AIR: PROGRESS 
AND CHALLENGES 14 (David C. Brill ed., 2005). 
 60. THEO LIPPMAN, JR. & DONALD C. HANSEN, MUSKIE 119 (1971). 
 61. Leon G. Billings, Why Ed Muskie Mattered, 13 ENVTL. F. 63, 65 (1996).  
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aggressive call to legislate environmental protection.62 Although Nixon did not 
necessarily seek to beat Muskie on the environmental front (knowing it was not 
feasible), he at least sought to stage a credible challenge. That Nixon and his 
Administration felt considerable pressure can be seen in the President’s 
directions to his staff–namely, how he used Muskie to frame environmental 
initiatives. 
For example, Nixon used Muskie as a reference point or sidebar for his 
own staff as he organized an environmental agenda and set boundaries for new 
policy—John Whitaker remembered being told by the President, “I want 
environmental cleanup, but not at such a cost-benefit ratio that’s going to hurt 
the economy. Don’t try to ‘out-clean’ Mr. Muskie; there’s no way you can do 
it.”63 Elsewhere Whitaker noted that “[Nixon] wanted a position between the 
liberal Muskie-dominated Senate Public Works and the conservative Cramer-
dominated House Public Works Committee.”64 Nixon’s position might also be 
characterized by staff member Christopher DeMuth’s recollection of Nixon’s 
disclaimer that “I’m not going to go as far as Muskie. Muskie would close down 
all of American [industry]. I won’t do that.”65 
Despite reservations and insistence that he would not go as far as Muskie, 
Nixon made a hard push to gain green ground. On the first day of 1970, he signed 
the National Environmental Policy Act and, in his accompanying statement, 
proclaimed the 1970s to be the decade of the environment.66 Later that year, he 
dedicated a significant part of his State of the Union Address to call for 
 
 62. See THE PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS RECOMMENDING A 37-POINT ADMINISTRATIVE AND 
LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM (Feb. 10, 1970), reprinted in 2 COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 1498–1511 (1974); Memorandum from John C. Whitaker, former 
Member, Domestic Policy Council, to Christopher DeMuth, Staff Assistant to the President (Dec. 11, 1969) (on 
file with authors as Nixon 2-7); Memorandum from John C. Whitaker, former Member, Domestic Policy 
Council, to John Campbell (Dec. 3, 1969) (on file with authors as Nixon 2-5); Memorandum from John C. 
Whitaker, former Member, Domestic Policy Council, to John D. Ehrlichman (Nov. 13, 1969) (on file with 
authors as Nixon 2-4); Memorandum from John C. Whitaker, former Member, Domestic Policy Council, to 
President Richard Nixon (Nov. 26, 1969) (on file with authors as Nixon 3-85); see also S. 3466, (1970) 
(empowering the Secretary to propose regulations establishing nation air quality standards), reprinted in 2 
COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 1483 (1974); 
SUMMARY OF CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970 (1970) (summarizing the 1970 amendments), reprinted in 
2 COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 1496 
(1974). 
 63. Interview by Frederick J. Graboske & Raymond H. Geselbracht with John C. Whitaker, former 
Member, Domestic Policy Council, in Alexandria, VA (Dec. 30, 1987) (on file with authors as Transcribed 
Interviews 2-12). 
 64. Memorandum from John C. Whitaker, former Member, Domestic Policy Council, to President Richard 
Nixon’s File (Apr. 1, 1970) (on file with authors as Nixon 2-117). 
 65. Interview by Frank Gannon, Richard Nixon Found., with Christopher DeMuth, Staff Assistant to 
President Richard Nixon (Apr. 27, 2010) (on file with authors as Transcribed Interviews 2-10). 
 66. Richard M. Nixon, former President, United States, Remarks at the Signing of the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (Jan. 1, 1970) (transcribed by the Richard Nixon Found.), 
https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2010/01/rn-in-70-the-decade-of-the-environment/. 
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environmental measures,67 including a call to make “[c]lean air, clean water, 
[and] open spaces . . . [a] birthright of every American.”68 He also concluded, 
“[t]hrough our years of past carelessness we incurred a debt to nature, and now 
that debt is being called.”69 Nixon followed up on his high rhetoric with a more 
detailed proposal in a separate “Environmental Message to Congress,”70 which 
was a thirty-seven point plan to tackle the environment, many of these points 
being more aggressive proposals to address air pollution than those found at the 
time in Congress.  
Thus, the Nixon Administration and the Democratic Congress initiated an 
arms race that would last the better part of Nixon’s first term to ramp up 
proposals, draft bills, and claim the issue71—creating, as a side effect, the most 
comprehensive and demonstrably effective environmental legislation of the 
modern era and, perhaps unintentionally, a new legal discipline.72 
Just eight days after Nixon presented his environmental message to 
Congress in February 1970, a new rendition of the National Air Quality 
Standards Act of 1970, sponsored by twenty-nine Republicans and four 
Democrats, was introduced before the Senate, incorporating Nixon’s call for the 
federal government to “establish nationwide air quality standards.”73 
Concurrently proposed in the House by a single Republican was a bill that 
focused on large stationary sources, and another concurrently introduced bill 
(sponsored by then-House Minority Leader Gerald Ford) sought to increase 
regulations on cars.74  
Although some involved in the process would later insist that the Senate 
was already moving in the direction of national standards,75 the effects of 
Nixon’s legislative proposal should not be overlooked. Congress’ existing 
 
 67. Richard Nixon, former President, United States, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the 
Union (Jan. 22, 1970), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/annual-message-the-congress-the-state-
the-union-2.  
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. THE PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS RECOMMENDING A 37-POINT ADMINISTRATIVE AND 
LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM (Feb. 10, 1970), reprinted in 2 COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 1505 (1974); see also S. 3466, (1970) (empowering the Secretary 
to propose regulations establishing nation air quality standards), reprinted in 2 COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 1483 (1974); SUMMARY OF CLEAN AIR 
ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970 (1970) (summarizing the 1970 amendments), reprinted in 2 COMM. ON PUB. 
WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 1496 (1974). 
 71. LAZARUS, supra note 8, at 76 (referring to the Clean Air Act as a “struggle between Nixon and 
Muskie”); Vogel, supra note 20, at 57 (1987) (discussing the “bidding war” that resulted in the Clean Air Act). 
 72. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
 73. THE PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS RECOMMENDING A 37-POINT ADMINISTRATIVE AND 
LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM (Feb. 10, 1970), reprinted in 2 COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 1505 (1974); see also S. 3466, (1970) (empowering the Secretary 
to propose regulations establishing nation air quality standards), reprinted in 2 COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 1483 (1974). 
 74. H.R. 16033, 91st Cong. (1970) (introduced in the House, Feb. 18, 1970).  
 75. See Air Pollution Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air & Water Pollution of the S. 
Comm. on Pub. Works, Exec. Sess. 20 (May 6, 1970) [hereinafter Public Works Hearings]. 
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momentum on air pollution, carried over from 1967, which had previously 
focused exclusively on expanding the regulatory range of Title II to cover noise 
pollution and jets, among other things,76 was thus redirected towards remaking 
the Clean Air Act on a more fundamental level by Nixon’s entry into the arena. 
Nationwide standards were the catalyst for a fundamentally different Clean Air 
Act. In the coming months, however, Congress would be digging far deeper than 
Nixon’s call for nationwide standards. 
And so, in March 1970, one month after Nixon’s address, the Senate looked 
to up the ante again by introducing new efforts to amend the entire Clean Air 
Act, now recognizing the “limited” objectives of the 1967 Air Quality Act;77 it 
additionally raised the rhetorical stakes by asserting that “the fight against 
pollution is not just a matter of cleaning up the environment but a necessity for 
man’s survival,” leveraging the polemic that the executive had failed to meet 
Congress’ efforts in air pollution legislation under previous law.78  
II.  SENATE AIR AND WATER POLLUTION SUBCOMMITTEE 
It was in this climate that Congress set out to capitalize on the opportunity 
by passing the 1970 Clean Air Act and thereby demonstrate its sensitivity to the 
public will.79 Even in the context of Nixon’s public statements and the House’s 
pressure to implement national standards, the Clean Air Act evolved 
considerably in the Senate and was in large part defined by the Senate 
Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution (“the Subcommittee”). In order to 
describe the coming-to-be of the Senate bill, in Subpart II.A, we consider the 
players in the room when the Subcommittee shaped the Clean Air Act. After 
introducing the Committee, we move on to highlight some players of particular 
importance in shaping the Act. In Subpart II.B, we consider Senator Ed Muskie, 
the primary player in Congress who influenced the substance of the Clean Air 
Act. In Subpart II.C, we discuss two other members of the Committee, Senators 
Howard Baker and Thomas Eagleton. Finally, we outline in Subpart II.D how 
Leon Billings and Tom Jorling, Senate staff members, played a key (and often 
diminished)80 role in making and strengthening the Act. 
 
 76. Introduction of Air Quality Improvement Act, S. 3229, 91st Cong. (1969), reprinted in 2 COMM. ON 
PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 1533 (1974). 
 77. SENATE CONSIDERATION OF THE REP. OF THE CONF. COMM. (Dec. 18, 1970), reprinted in 1 COMM. ON 
PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 124 (1974). 
 78. Introduction of National Air Quality Standards Act of 1970, S. 3546, 91st Cong. (1970), reprinted in 
2 COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 1470 
(1974).  
 79. William Steif, Nader’s Raiders Take on Muskie, SCRIPPS-HOWARD (May 13, 1970) (on file with 
authors as Muskie 1-34). 
 80. This is not to say that the role of staffers Leon Billings and Tom Jorling has been entirely ignored; see 
infra note 213. 
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A. THE SUBCOMMITTEE 
The more Nixon-aligned House moved quickly on all of the air pollution 
suggestions found in Nixon’s thirty-seven point proposal on the environment. 
Many of these proposals were rolled into a single bill that was introduced on 
April 27, 1970,81 and it was passed out of the House about a month later.82 The 
bill then moved to the Air and Water Pollution Subcommittee of the Senate 
Public Works Committee. The Subcommittee acted as the primary, largely 
independent, vessel for the Act, as it argued over and crafted a bill with little 
influence from organized lobbies, staff would argue.83 While some of the 
innovations of the Clean Air Act made their way into the legislation as a result 
of efforts or points made by the Nixon or House, in large part what made the 
Clean Air Act so different from its antecedents came into the bill during the 
Subcommittee’s deliberations—setting air quality and emission limitations 
based solely on public health criteria, a strong but balanced federal role,84 
enforceable statutory deadlines and standards (what became known together as 
“technology forcing”),85 and a provision for citizen suits.  
Subcommittee deliberations took place in the ironically smoke-saturated, 
mid-sized Public Works Committee conference room, number 4200, in the New 
Senate Office building, also known as the Dirksen.86 These meetings were out 
of the public eye and off record, though stenographic notes were taken—a 
number of which, but not all, still survive. 
Who sat around the table? Unfortunately, but typical for the time, all 
Subcommittee members and staff were white men. Also, an ironic note worth 
making when considering clean air legislation, every member of the 
Subcommittee and staff, except one, smoked: some puffed at cigars, others 
worked through packs of cigarettes as they discussed public health standards and 
air quality indices.87 Windows in the conference room remained closed,88 and so 
one can easily imagine the rising, trapped smoke filtering upwards past the 
chandelier and meeting the wood-paneled walls and ceiling.  
The Subcommittee worked near the Foreign Relations hearing and 
conference rooms, a hotspot of crucial congressional action as the Vietnam War 
 
 81. H.R. 17255, 91st Cong. (1970) (introduced in the House, Apr. 27, 1970) . 
 82. Id. (reported in the House, June 3, 1970). 
 83. Interview by Brien Williams with Leon Billings, former Staff Dir., U.S. Senate Env’t Subcomm., in 
Washington, D.C. (Nov. 17, 2008), https://digitalcommons.bowdoin.edu/mitchelloralhistory/194/ (“[I]t was an 
era in which ten or eleven men . . . sat around in a closed room and talk about what public policy ought to be, 
without the influence of lobbyists and damn little influence of staff.”). 
 84. Kramer, supra note 8, at 48 (“The federal role in the enforcement aspect of air pollution control has 
been changed dramatically by the 1970 Amendments. Federal participation in what will be called a supervisory 
or approval role, is basically a new addition to the regulatory scheme. This supervisory role encompasses the 
federal government’s newly appointed powers to approve, disapprove, and promulgate state regulations and 
variances dealing with the air pollution abatement program.”). 
 85. Gerard & Lave, supra note 21, at 763. 
 86. Interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 37. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
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intensified.89 Due to the throngs of anti-Vietnam student-protesters in 
Washington, the halls were crowded and would frequently ring with anti-war 
chants when members of Congress were present, generally smelling not only of 
tobacco from the conference rooms but also of demonstrators’ marijuana 
smoke.90 Somehow, surrounded by the haze of their own smoke and tucked away 
from a progressive youth movement, this demonstrably homogenous and 
institutionalist collection of legislators, embodying uncontested privilege in 
America, worked out the fundamental piece of U.S. Code which would make 
significant progress in cleaning the air and protecting millions of Americans’ 
health and well-being. 
Members and staff sat around the oblong conference table at the center of 
the room, ranked by seniority. Acoustics were poor, so everyone present had to 
speak up.91 Jennings Randolph, chair of the full Committee and ex officio 
member of the Subcommittee, often occupied the head of the table and acted as 
a sort of mediator, known as being “characteristically moderate.”92 In his 
absence, Subcommittee Chair Ed Muskie took the head seat.93 Left of Muskie 
sat Muskie’s staff director and the-first full-time staff member of the 
Subcommittee, Leon Billings of Montana.94 Although just a staff member, his 
influence is matched with his prominent seat at the table—he had Muskie’s ear 
and generally stood between the Subcommittee and the language of the bills.95 
Left of Billings sat the majority Democrats, Thomas F. Eagleton, Birch Bayh, 
Joseph M. Montoya, and William Spong.96 Sitting opposite the Democrats were 
minority Republicans Caleb Boggs, John Sherman Cooper, Howard Baker, Bob 
Dole, and counsel Thomas Jorling.97  
Although it should be acknowledged that every member of the 
Subcommittee entered into the discussion and participated in the process (a point 
the Subcommittee itself was wont to acknowledge),98 of those at the table, 
Muskie and Eagleton from the majority, Cooper and Baker of the minority, and 
staff members Billings and Jorling exerted notable influence on the Clean Air 
Act. We discuss the roles of each of these in turn. 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See A Bill to Amend the Clean Air Act and for Other Purposes: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Pub. 
Works, Exec. Sess. 6 (Aug. 27, 1970) [hereinafter Public Works Hearings] (offering an example of a comment 
concerning the acoustics). 
 92. A Bill to Amend the Clean Air Act and for Other Purposes: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air & 
Water Pollution, Exec. Sess. 50 (Aug. 19, 1970) [hereinafter Air & Water Pollution Hearings] (statement of 
Sen. Howard Baker). 
 93. Interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 37. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See infra Subpart II.D. 
 96. Interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 37. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See A Bill to Amend the Clean Air Act and for Other Purposes: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Pub. 
Works, Exec. Sess. 491 (Sept. 11, 1970) (statement of Sen. John Sherman Cooper). 
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B. SENATOR ED MUSKIE  
Senator Ed Muskie warrants first consideration. A testament to his role, the 
Clean Air Act was, at times, called the “Muskie Bill” by frustrated White House 
staff.99 Staffer Leon Billings later argued that the Clean Air Act was Muskie’s 
“outstanding achievement.”100 In the Senate Subcommittee, Muskie offered two 
discrete policy contributions to the Clean Air Act that largely justify these 
sweeping characterizations—both of which grew out of lessons Muskie took 
from earlier versions of the Act and that we detail in this Subpart: a focus on 
public health, rather than a technical or economic feasibility, and an evolved 
take on shared federalism (the product of Muskie coming to terms with, although 
modifying, the momentum for national standards generated by Nixon’s thirty-
seven points). 
To be clear, Muskie did not always see himself as an environment-oriented 
legislator.101 When first elected to the U.S. Senate, his priority was to make a 
name for himself by bringing economic development to his generally rural 
constituency in Maine.102 Despite being a hunter and fisherman, Muskie’s 
transition to matters of environmental conservation was something of a 
byproduct of political happenstance, rather than personal background or 
values.103 Muskie was punished and exiled by being assigned to the Senate 
Public Works Committee, a result of sparring with Southern-dominated 
Democratic seniority, including Majority Leader and future-President Lyndon 
B. Johnson.104  
At the time, public infrastructure, mainly upkeep of federal buildings, was 
front and center for the Public Works Committee.105 This committee, along with 
the Government Operation’s Intergovernmental Relations’ Subcommittee and 
the Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs’ Housing Subcommittee, were 
considered by most as “secondary” committees106—the sort of places Johnson 
would send senators “with a penchant for independence and an inclination 
toward liberal activism” in order to isolate them and maintain a more 
conservative party core.107 To the extent that Johnson wanted to punish Muskie, 
he succeeded, at least at first. Muskie’s initial reaction to his assignment to 
Public Works and the Air and Water Subcommittee was one of 
 
 99. Memorandum from Dwight L. Chapin, Deputy Assistant to President Richard Nixon, to H.R. 
Haldeman, Chief of Staff, White House (Dec. 28, 1970) (on file with authors as Nixon 1-48). 
 100. Billings, supra note 61. 
 101. See Blohmquist, supra note 20, at 1–17; Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57. 
 102. See Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Blohmquist, supra note 20, at 10–11; PAUL CHARLES MILAZZO, UNLIKELY ENVIRONMENTALISTS: 
CONGRESS AND CLEAN WATER, 1945–1972, at 69 (2006). 
 105. See History and Recent Membership of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. SENATE 
COMM. ON ENV’T & PUB. WORKS, https://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/committee-history/ (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
 106. See interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57. 
 107. MILAZZO, supra note 104. 
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disappointment108: “Air? What the hell do I care about air coming from 
Maine?”109 In fact, he was initially more interested in the Rivers and Harbors 
Subcommittee because, in his words, “a little pork won’t do me any harm.”110 
Compounding his initial disappointment, Muskie became the first 
Chairman of the Air and Water Pollution Subcommittee upon its creation in 
1963;111 after all, fighting pollution brought “little political payoff” at this 
time.112 
As Robert Blohmquist recognizes, Muskie faced serious obstacles in 
passing pollution legislation of any significance; in addition to a lack of any anti-
pollution legislation of consequence,113 he was also up against “a presidential 
administration which was, at best, lukewarm in its desire to protect the 
environment . . . a quiescent and ill-informed public . . . and a recalcitrant, self-
serving assortment of American industrial firms resistant to the notion of more 
rigorous and costly government pollution standards.”114 His ascendancy on the 
environment in committee might be explained by the fact that the interests of the 
Committee Chairman Jennings Randolph were found in the brick-and-mortar 
aspect of the Committee, which essentially left an opportunistic and increasingly 
ambitious Muskie to run things on the environment for the Democratic side.115 
He quickly began work on various bills that laid the framework for later anti-
pollution legislation, some of which has been outlined above: the Clean Air Act 
of 1963, the Water Quality Act of 1965, the Air Quality Act of 1967, and even 
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.116  
Regardless of his initial motivation, Muskie had adopted a more ostensibly 
“environmental” outlook by 1967. During the Clean Air Act legislation process, 
he employed the parlance of the emerging ecological sciences, referring multiple 
times to “ecological systems”117 and the effects of dirty air on “soils, water, 
vegetation . . . animals, wildlife . . . [and] climate.”118 Consideration of these 
non-human elements was central in Muskie’s provisions of pollutant criteria as 
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 109. MILAZZO, supra note 104, at 70. 
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 113. DAVID NEVIN, MUSKIE OF MAINE 184 (1972). 
 114. Blohmquist, supra note 20, at 17. 
 115. Russell E. Train: Oral History Interview, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://archive.epa.gov/ 
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product of Senator Jackson’s Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, Muskie and the Public Works Committee’s 
Senate Bill 7, as well as competitions between the committees, had a significant impact on the National 
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topic, see Sam Kalen, Ecology Comes of Age: NEPA’s Lost Mandate, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 113 (2010). 
 117. Air Pollution Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air & Water Pollution of the S. Comm. 
on Pub. Works, Exec. Sess. 20 (July 16, 1970) [hereinafter Public Works Hearings] (statement of Sen. Edmund 
Muskie). 
 118. Air & Water Pollution Hearings, supra note 92, at 5 (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie). 
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they existed prior to 1970, and were incorporated into the enactment as 
secondary standards during conference deliberations of the 1970 Act.119 
The 1970 Clean Air Act’s public health (or rather, “health of persons”) 
focus is thus both an extension of patterns exhibited by earlier legislation and a 
lesson learned by the lukewarm effect of Muskie’s previous clean air efforts. 
While maintaining a focus on health, Muskie and his Committee now recognized 
that there could no longer be equivocation concerning standards and deadlines, 
nor could they seek only to employ “available” technologies.120 By 1970, it was 
clear to Muskie that the job of Congress was not to make “technological 
judgments” but to establish what the “public interest requires in terms of 
health.”121  
Previous years and legislation experience with clean air drove in a very real 
distrust for industry among members of the Subcommittee.122 Its executive 
session stenographs are heavily populated with Muskie’s urging that standards 
consider the effects of pollution on public health alone, without regard towards 
effects on industry or for industry’s evaluations of what it could or could not do: 
in fact, to the extent he focused on industry, it was to express pessimism that it 
would “drag its feet” and demonstrate the same lack of urgency as in previous 
years,123 continuing to be “as conservative as the devil.”124 After one meeting 
with CEOs from the four major American automobile manufacturers, Muskie 
proclaimed, “If that’s the quality of American business leadership, I can 
understand why the Japanese are beating the hell out of us.”125 
No doubt affected by the opportunity to capitalize on the political fervor 
and pressure from the environmental movement, Muskie saw to it that language 
considering “technical feasibility” be removed from the legislation, having been 
present as late as December of 1969.126 Justifying this decision before the 
Senate, Muskie argued that “we learned that tests of economic and technological 
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Water Pollution of the S. Comm. on Pub. Works, Exec. Sess. 142 (Aug. 4, 1970) [hereinafter Air & Water 
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feasibility applied to those standards compromise the health of our people and 
lead to inadequate standards.”127 
According to Muskie, to make reference to economic factors directly, in 
fact, would be to “dilute” the concept of the bill, which was public health 
exclusively.128 “Now what may seem economically prohibitive today may with 
the benefit of hindsight ten years from now look like a very cheap answer that 
we should have insisted upon at that time if we had only known,” he insisted 
before the Subcommittee.129 Muskie’s idea of public health was not only 
oriented towards the majority of the people, but also particularly sensitive or 
vulnerable groups. Although it would be a question left for the courts to 
determine how many people must be protected by the standards.130  
Muskie established multiple times on record that the Act was intended to 
address the needs of the vulnerable minority131: “the elderly, the young, and the 
sick.”132 From the beginning, he urged the Subcommittee to center measurable 
physiological public health metrics as the primary standard.133 It was this 
orientation of the bill’s goals that allowed it, in conjunction with contributions 
offered by his Senate colleagues, to force technology to adapt to strict statutory 
standards. Thus, Muskie set the stage ideologically for the technology forcing 
function of the Clean Air Act by centering public health and disregarding 
technological feasibility.  
A second major evolution in environmental law ushered in through the Act 
was the degree of federalization of regulatory authority over environmental 
pollution control created by delegating large segments of power to state 
governments (using their own boundaries to define jurisdiction) in determining 
how to meet his heath-based standards,134 while simultaneously increasing 
federal power of review and enforcement. Responsibility for a stronger federal 
presence is shared between the House and Senate; section 113 of the Senate bill 
did much to expand the role of the EPA, and section 110(a)(3) took its final form 
in the conference committee, largely the product of the House conferees.135 
Muskie’s stance on the issue of the role of federal versus state powers is mixed 
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and, we argue, contributed to a more balanced outcome, perhaps ironically 
moderating the federalizing pushes of the Administration and House. 
Muskie himself was initially ideologically opposed to this transition of 
authority towards the federal government. Again, national standards, unlike the 
lion’s share of what would become the Clean Air Act, actually find their origin 
in the Nixon Administration and more conservative House committees.136 
Although his original position going into 1970 was to carry over the regional 
standards approach of his earlier legislation, Muskie recognized that the logic of 
a health-based standard required a nationally uniform standard in order to be 
maximally enforceable by a federal agency—after all, to set higher standards in 
some regions might give the impression of prioritizing the health of those people 
at the expense of others.137 
Muskie’s earlier concern was based on a fear that that the House and 
Administration version’s national ambient air quality standards provision would 
trend the other way and result in some compromise in terms of standard setting 
(e.g. setting national standards as permissive as the most conservative state 
would permit), and thus create a standard too low to protect the health of 
vulnerable persons.138 Cooper, always the statesman, even had to confront 
Muskie on the issue, asking, “[w]ell, you rejected everything else Nixon wants, 
how about nationalizing air quality standards?”139 In fact, two years prior, during 
a House-Senate Colloquium on a national environmental policy, Muskie 
demonstrated his aversion to national standards when he stated that that “there 
must be a great diversity in whatever [standards] we get at,” and, most strikingly, 
that the Congress “ought to avoid the straitjacket of Federal standards.”140  
Muskie eventually conceded, however, possibly compelled by political 
necessity or out of competition with Nixon, that merely stimulating greater local 
planning and standard-setting was insufficient,141 and that only uniform 
standards could create the requisite sense of urgency and eliminate the risk of 
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appearing equivocal or arbitrary on the issue of public health.142 Thus, Muskie 
needed to step aside in order to federalize regulation, initially acting as a sort of 
barrier. 
However, once he accepted the thinking of federalizing power, he further 
worked to strengthen the role of the federal government and the nation-wide 
consistency of enforcement, demanding that federal or “national muscle” be 
exerted in non-attaining areas below the established national standard, a move 
prescient of the still-forthcoming Environmental Protection Agency.143 In fact, 
Muskie was never ignorant of the Act’s potential to alter the landscape of 
American federalism; introducing the bill in Subcommittee, he acknowledged 
that it represented “a major extension of federal involvement in air pollution 
control and will require an expanded federal presence.”144  
“We learned from experience with implementation of the law that States 
and local cities need greater incentives and assistance to protect the health and 
welfare of all people,”145 Muskie told the Senate as he presented his bill. A race 
to the bottom phenomenon prevented the states from shouldering pollution 
control by themselves.146 Because of inadequate enforcement, he determined, 
“[t]he Federal presence and backup authority had to be increased.”147 His 
inclusion of land use and transportation control regulatory elements in 
conference committee also created a new field of EPA control over state plans 
and widened the agency’s toehold in the matter of the states.148 
Balancing national standards with state-driven implementation would 
allow uniform protection of public health standards by setting a “line”149 that 
could not be crossed anywhere, even when economic growth would be halted,150 
and preventing some regions from slacking in order to draw economic growth, 
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while still preserving some power in the states.151 Operationally, Muskie and his 
colleagues settled on the idea of state implementation plans, the largest moving 
part of the Act and a critical evolution over the “regulatory zones” of the 1967 
Air Quality Act.152 By giving a mandate to the states to regulate sources while 
shifting some pressure from the states to the federal government, Congress’ new 
framework allowed the legislation to justify more stringent standards while 
providing the states with some discretion about how to meet federal standards. 
In the event that states failed to meet set federal standards, the Act would create 
a non-discretionary duty for the federal government to step in and make the call 
instead, absolving the state of assuming political fallout. 
Thus, although the Act broadened federal authority, Muskie was careful to 
design it so as not to create an unwieldy federal bureaucracy. In Senate debates, 
for example, Muskie was sure to emphasize the latent primacy of states and 
municipalities in enforcement.153 Instead, the Act sought to give to states the 
responsibility and authority to act at first, with federal agency action reserved as 
a back-up in the case of state failure.154 Muskie moderated the expansion of 
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federal authority and saw to a balanced vision of Clean Air Act federalism.155 
The coming EPA was intended by the Clean Air Act to assume the role of the 
“gorilla in the closet,” as the first Administrator of the EPA, William 
Ruckelshaus, characterized it, who would oversee, but not commandeer, the 
operations of the states.156 
It is worth noting that Muskie led the Subcommittee by working to build 
consensus, rather than by commanding or asserting himself unnecessarily. 
Howard Baker, Muskie’s Republican counterpart on the Subcommittee, called 
him “lead ass” for his ability to sit and listen to questions and comments about 
potential legislation for hours until he was totally satisfied that the needs of the 
Subcommittee were taken into account, sometimes leaving the office at 10:00 at 
night with a stack of memos and returning at 5:00 in the morning with responses 
ready.157 In the conference committee, however, Muskie was able to shift from 
patterns of compromise and instead draw the line in order to protect the integrity 
of the Senate bill with minimal unnecessary substantive concessions.158 
As a final note on the importance of Senator Muskie in the development of 
the Act, it must be acknowledged that his political stature as a threat to Nixon 
placed significant pressure on the President to adopt the environment as an issue 
in general. After Ted Kennedy’s Chappaquiddick incident ruined his chances at 
the Presidency, Muskie became the Democratic frontrunner to challenge Nixon 
in 1972.159 Polls showed Muskie as a true threat to defeat the Republican 
President.160 Despite some criticism from radicals like Ralph Nader,161 Muskie 
had broad appeal to Democrats due to his strength on Civil Rights and the 
environment. While Muskie’s campaign for the Presidency would eventually be 
derailed by a forged letter accusing him of racism towards French-Canadians,162 
his status as the lead challenger to Nixon gave strength to the environmental 
movement and motivated Republicans to back environmental initiatives.163 
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C. SENATORS BAKER AND EAGLETON  
Although these contributions and the ideological framing provided by 
Senator Muskie established a base for the Clean Air Act, particular details of the 
bill were the result of participation in the legislation process by other members 
of the Subcommittee, particularly Senator Baker from the Republican Minority 
and Senator Eagleton from the Democratic Majority, as mentioned above. An 
issue that would come to follow strict party lines in later decades, the Clean Air 
Act surprisingly received robust support from Subcommittee members of both 
parties at its genesis. If Senator Muskie, the poster boy of the environmental 
movement, was an “unlikely environmentalist,”164 then the rest of the 
Committee’s members were even less likely environmentalists. Even if they 
were skilled legislators with the best of intentions, there was nothing in the past 
of these senators that made them likely candidates to do what they did in 
advancing policies to protect the environment.  
What makes their contributions all the more worth understanding is that 
despite these Senators’ odd fit for the job, they made some of the most 
innovative contributions to the Act, which oftentimes are wrongly credited to 
Senator Muskie alone. Indeed, between Senators Howard Baker and Thomas 
Eagleton, crucial structures of technology forcing were advanced within the 
Subcommittee and implemented into the Clean Air Act, in large part giving the 
Clean Air Act teeth. The ingredients they offered, outlined below, together 
minimized potentially obstructive Administrative deference and forced the 
hands of both the EPA and the courts for decades to come.165 
Next to Senator Muskie, Senator Baker (R-Tennessee) is frequently 
credited from those involved for playing what might be seen as the most 
important role of any senator on the Committee in the Act’s legislative process. 
Deep into one late executive session, for example, Senator Eagleton commented 
that Baker persevered on the bill “second to none, or maybe second to 
Muskie.”166 Baker was recalled as Muskie’s “first mate and later his co-captain” 
on the environment,167 and was known as a great conciliator for his ability to 
bring together proponents of vastly different ideologies and reach 
compromise.168 After his death, a Democratic colleague memorialized Baker, 
saying that “Howard Baker’s distinguished career as senator and statesman is a 
product of his unique capacity to win the confidence and trust of even those with 
whom he fundamentally disagreed.”169 This unique capacity became especially 
important while Baker worked on environmental policy on the Committee. 
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Despite any complaints of industry to the contrary, Baker, a “technological 
cornucopian,”170 strongly believed in American industry’s capacity to adapt and 
overcome technological challenges.171 The term “technology forcing” was first 
coined by the courts,172 partially in reference to Senator Eagleton’s words in 
Subcommittee executive session,173 to refer to the Clean Air Act’s provision “to 
require stationary sources of air pollution to comply with regulatory standards 
or shut down, even if the state’s emission control requirements are economically 
or technically impossible to achieve,” thus seeking to “induce technical 
innovation.”174  
Technology forcing is both a complement to and a consequence of 
commitment to Muskie’s public health focus. “The health of people is more 
important,” the Senate report reads, “than the question of whether the early 
achievement of ambient air quality standards protective of health is technically 
feasible. . . . Therefore, the Committee determined that existing sources of 
pollutants either should meet the standard of the law or be closed down.”175 
In committee, Baker frequently and aggressively pushed the issue of using 
public policy to force technological evolution. On one occasion in executive 
session, for example, Billings expressed what seemed to be an ostensible display 
of doubt regarding the practicality of the forcing concept being pursued by the 
Committee, to which Baker responded “Leon, you are a gentle advocate, and 
what you are trying to do is to lead into saying that this isn’t practical, but it 
is.”176  
The auto industry saw the possibility of avoiding heavy investment into 
cleaner cars on the basis of economic and technological infeasibility, and 
discussions with industry representatives became frustrating for members of the 
Subcommittee;177 thus, as conflict between Committee members and industry 
representatives grew more common, the distaste held by the Senators towards 
the auto industry grew. One example of this comes from a particularly intense 
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meeting where industry representatives were attempting to convince a skeptical 
Committee that the technology standard pushed by the Subcommittee was not 
feasible for the industry to meet. Part way through the meeting, minority counsel 
Tom Jorling left the meeting room to use the restroom.178  
On this occasion, he was followed by one of the technical people from 
General Motors. While standing next to each other at the urinal, the man 
confided to Jorling: “We can build whatever you tell us to build. If you tell us to 
build a clean car, we will build a clean car.”179 There were other instances where 
manila envelopes were sent anonymously to the Subcommittee with internal 
documents that undercut positions industry representatives had made to the 
Committee.180 Interactions like these did not do any favors for the auto 
companies, and Baker was able to win over the Committee members, doubling 
down on Muskie’s general skepticism, that industry could comply with the 
standards included in the bill. History would vindicate the technology forcing 
approach. As a result of the law, new emission control technologies were 
induced for various polluting industries, including copper smelting and electric 
power production.181 
Another important contribution of Senator Baker to the Act was his 
unwavering efforts to push along the work of the Committee, which translated 
to his unwavering support of the enactment’s passage. It is not hard to imagine 
that Senator Baker’s support of the bill (as the Committee’s minority ranking 
member) gave many other Republicans comfort—he was no Senator Muskie 
who aspired to unseat a GOP President. Baker’s support, certainly along with 
the President’s earlier call for clean air legislation, gave ample political cover 
for Republicans in Congress who wanted to support the Clean Air Act.  
Another Senator, Thomas Eagleton, also bore significant influence on the 
Act and helped ideate policy mechanisms to translate the intentions of the 
Subcommittee into meaningful law. More than any other Subcommittee 
member, Eagleton was responsible for the many fixed statutory deadlines found 
in the Clean Air Act. Like his colleagues, Eagleton may have been aware of 
broad public cynicism concerning Congress.182 His pitch when coming to the 
Committee, as later characterized and most likely caricaturized by staff member 
Leon Billings, demonstrates these feelings: “You know, we tell the public all 
this bullshit about how we are going to do something and then we never do it 
because we don’t set deadlines. If I am going to participate in the process, we 
are going to set deadlines on this law.”183 
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The Clean Air Act operates by deadlines to force action at various levels 
of government;184 a thirty-day limit on EPA to publish standards, nine months 
granted to the states to submit implementation plans after comment review,185 
seven months for emissions standards promulgation,186 and so on.187 Most 
importantly, an insistence for deadlines-forcing resulted in Title II’s statutory 
1975 deadline for a ninety percent reduction in hydrocarbons and carbon 
monoxide reduction and later became the bill’s key source of controversy,188 a 
major hang-up for both the Nixon Administration and the House conferees.189 
The Administration bill had initially set the goal of 1980, but Eagleton, Muskie, 
and the Committee sought an even more ambitious goal of achieving the 
pollution reduction goals five years earlier. Eagleton was the “initiator” of the 
conversation of statutory deadlines for ambient air quality standards and pushed 
the 1975 deadline in particular.190  
Tasked with enforcing this stringent deadline, Russell Train, as the second 
Administrator of the EPA, called the decision “arbitrary.”191 And, admittedly, 
this criticism is not without merit. However, as Eagleton insisted, arbitrary 
deadlines still had the power to force action, and a firm deadline was better than 
a lax one to this end. Eagleton’s drive to set a deadline that would create 
significant pressure on industry was not necessarily borne out of a belief that 
they would definitely achieve it, but rather out of a broader awareness that 
without deadlines, action would be delayed indefinitely. As he stated in 
executive session:  
I just felt that unless you put an identifiable goal and try to force, as it were, 
use the word “force,” people towards that goal. If it is open-ended, God 
knows whenever we will get to the goal. . . . I am not saying this all won’t be 
amended two or three or four years from now. If we don’t have a date in it, 
in my judgment somewhere along the line it will go on into the 90’s and the 
year 2000.192 
Eagleton’s insistence for deadlines also folded in well with Muskie’s and 
Baker’s broader goals, who stated that a deadline by statute best leverages the 
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ethos of Congress to communicate the “urgency of the problem, the importance 
of public health. . . . [T]his is the goal[;] Congress says it is.”193 Or, as Baker 
articulated, deadlines by statute force action and shield the decision from future 
political pressure: “[W]e have got to have some sort of future arbitrary date if 
we are going to accomplish anything and . . . we have got to relieve the Secretary 
of HEW” of lobbying “to have the regulations changed or a date extended, or an 
exception granted, and the like.”194 This recognition that such an “arbitrary date” 
must be soon enough so as to spur innovation was balanced against the 
recognition that a date set too soon carried the risk of discrediting the law.195 
Other innovations of the Senate bill also set it apart from the House version, 
though the sources of these changes are harder to square with the Congressional 
Record. Criminal penalties and citizen suits, while not included in the House 
bill,196 were integral parts of the Senate version, giving teeth to other provisions 
and providing incentives for the government to comply with federal mandates 
and polluters to comply with regulations. While the legislative record isn’t 
entirely conclusive on the inclusion of these ideas into the bill and the 
circumstances in which they were incorporated, first-hand accounts from 
Billings and Jorling give some hints as to factors that encouraged their adoption.  
The idea of citizen suits apparently originated not only outside the 
Committee, but also outside the Senate altogether.197 At the time, Professor 
Joseph Sax (then at the University of Michigan Law School) was writing articles 
that pushed federal courts to provide the opportunity for citizens to litigate 
environmental issues, a concept tested at a smaller scale in the form of the 
Michigan Environmental Protection Act.198 According to Jorling and Billings, 
Sax had introduced Michigan Senator Phil Hart to these ideas with hopes of them 
being included in some federal environmental legislation.199 Senator Hart also 
happened to be Ed Muskie’s closest personal friend in the Senate, giving him 
Muskie’s ear and allowing him to ask Muskie to incorporate Sax’s ideas into the 
1970 Clean Air Act.200 Although Muskie initially “hated”201 the idea, according 
to Billings, he insisted that it be considered by the Subcommittee as a favor to 
his friend Senator Hart.202 The staunchest supporters of the idea of citizen suits 
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on the Subcommittee, on the other hand, seem to have been Senators Eagleton 
and Baker.203 
The arrival of the idea of citizen suits came at an opportune time as the 
members considered what to do when “the government doesn’t act on a 
mandatory duty.”204 Thus, Hart’s friendship with Muskie and the need for a 
check on the government led to the adoption of citizen suits as the bill’s vehicle 
for enforcement. This sat well with Baker and Eagleton, who had been 
advocating for a remedy to governmental failure to comply with mandates that 
went beyond oversight.205  
Finally, the legislative record gives little indication of who introduced 
criminal penalties to the Senate bill, but it does show that it was a point of debate 
and discussion.206 While the final determination that entered the enactment set 
the maximum penalty for five years’ imprisonment,207 the evolution of the 
discussion is not altogether clear. We do find at least initial hesitation on the part 
of Senator Cooper, who held the position that imprisonment was never a power 
to be taken lightly, representing a conservative ideology that was rooted in his 
concern over power of the state.208 Despite the reservations of Cooper, the 
penalties made it into the bill, giving the necessary teeth to the Clean Air Act to 
demand that it be taken seriously and marked a serious innovation by the 
Subcommittee.  
D. STAFF CONTRIBUTIONS OF LEON BILLINGS AND THOMAS JORLING 
The roles that Leon Billings and Tom Jorling played on the Committee 
were also significant.209 They were not only the work engines that translated the 
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Subcommittee’s deliberations into concise statutory language and organized the 
agenda, they were also active participants at critical decision points, at times 
even being advocates for policy positions, generally granted considerable 
deference by full members of Subcommittee.210 In other words, their 
contributions affected both the atmosphere of deliberation and the language of 
the Act itself. Other staff members, such as Minority Chief of Staff Richard B. 
Royce and Chief Counsel M. Barry Meyer, participated actively in discussions 
and should not be overlooked altogether, but Billings and Jorling stand out for 
their prominent role in the Subcommittee’s work on the Clean Air Act and 
continued engagement in overseeing the Act in the coming years,211 justifying 
the particular attention we pay to them in this Subpart. 
Jorling and Billings had come to know each other during the 1968 election 
cycle, even before they began work together on the Public Works Committee.212 
Their ability to work well together was derived from their respective 
backgrounds; Billings believed strongly in the environmental issue,213 and 
Jorling had a rare postgraduate education in ecology, then a budding scientific 
discipline.214 Billings was, in his own words, “the political guy who didn’t know 
jack shit about the environment,”215 while Jorling was “the environmentalist 
who had gone to law school and had some fixed ideas on what was wrong with 
the public policy.”216  
Of the two staff members, perhaps due to his bombastic personality, 
Billings’ voice was heard frequently on the Committee. Billings’ stature was 
even noted by the popular press media of the day, which characterized him 
facetiously as “Senator Billings,”217 and he similarly claimed to have garnered a 
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reputation in Detroit among the auto making industry.218 Despite his modesty in 
claiming “damn little influence” on the Subcommittee,219 Leon Billings in 
reality held a prominent place in the air legislation process and in the Committee 
generally,220 supporting tough provisions in Committee and defending the bill 
against detractors,221 like an up-and-coming Ralph Nader.222 President Cole of 
General Motors told Billings over dinner that he believed he could “spit at the 
real cause of the auto industry’s problem on clean air in Washington,” implying 
that Billings was the “real” driver of the Clean Air Act.223 Cole continued by 
“tirad[ing] against the staff for distorting the information” and accused Billings 
of “deliberately misinforming the members,” further claiming that “not a single 
member of the Committee had ever read the bill nor did they understand it, 
indicating that [Billings] was the only person who knew the legislation at all.”224 
Someone even etched into the plaster wall of a telephone booth across the hall 
of the Committee’s offices the ominous confession “Leon Billings is God.”225 
Jorling played the important role of advising the Republican Senators on 
legal and ecological matters as minority counsel, and it may be difficult to 
overstate the degree of importance that his cross-disciplinary background had in 
fulfilling his responsibilities on the Committee.226 Jorling helped the 
Subcommittee run smoothly and efficiently by providing important context and 
information regarding both the science and language of the enactment during 
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deliberations in Subcommittee and negotiations between Senate and House 
conferees.227 While this work often required long hours of tedious work poring 
over details, it allowed for the Senators to sort through ideas and deliberate 
effectively. Having come to the Committee with hesitations about working for 
Republicans, with whom he disagreed on some issues,228 Jorling embraced the 
opportunity to achieve his bold environmental ambitions while serving the 
members of the Committee. 
Most specifically, Billings’ and Jorling’s positions put them “closest to 
language,”229 standing between the Senators and the bill’s text, interpreting 
proposed language and evaluating its probable impact. They were also the point-
men in the effort to take “the maze out” of the text by insisting on clear, 
straightforward, and mandatory language.230 This non-discretionary nature, 
dominating much of the Clean Air Act, would later become crucial in forcing 
the hand of the EPA and the courts to enforce the Act consistently and in line 
with congressional intentions.231 As Jorling remembers, the two were committed 
to the viewpoint that “discretion always meant either delay or non-
performance.”232 Mandatory language protected the at-times-willing EPA from 
political backlash in making tough regulatory decisions and twisted the arm of 
other-times-unwilling EPA programs just the same.233  
Ultimately, in the spirit of Muskie’s aim for “national muscle,” Billings 
insisted that “given the choice from being controversial or being weak, [the 
agencies] always chose weakness” and needed to be compelled rather than 
guided.234 In particular, Billings petitioned the Committee to exclude from the 
Clean Air Act the term “significantly” and other adverbs “that tended to make it 
possible to argue what Congress really meant.”235 Uses of “may” were swapped 
by staff out for “shall” and, with little controversy or discussion, Billings and 
Jorling shaved off the “fuzz language” of previous bills that severely limited 
their meaning and worked to narrow potentially significant language like 
“minute” and “irreversible harm.”236 Jorling believes that this effort paid off, and 
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that the language of the Act was sufficiently straightforward that the courts have 
generally interpreted the text in a way that he sees as true to the Committee’s 
intent.237 
III.  CONFERENCE COMMITTEE AND PASSAGE 
The work of the Senate Committee, however, still had to survive some 
scrutiny in the form of conference committee with the more Administration-
sensitive and conservative House conferees before the Act was in the clear. This 
Part follows the story of the challenges posed to the Senate bill both by the 
conference process itself and in the process of securing President Nixon’s 
signature. Although Nixon publicly called for clean air legislation and endorsed 
Congress’ early working bills, the bill had evolved in the Senate Committee to 
demand much more than that which the President originally sought, and 
significantly more than he was comfortable with. Both stories, that of the 
conference committee and the signing, demonstrate a through-line of agonism 
between Nixon and Muskie which signified their larger political rivalry, perhaps 
even threatening to sink the Clean Air Act altogether. 
A. CLEARING CONFERENCE COMMITTEE 
The Subcommittee’s bill cleared the Senate with minimal scarring from 
floor debates. Like the House’s earlier bill, the bill passed out of the Senate with 
overwhelming support, garnering a unanimous vote of eighty-six to zero.238 
Because the bills from the House and the Senate were so different, a lot hung in 
the balance as both the Senate and the House appointed members to the 
conference committee, where the conferees would need to reconcile the weaker 
House bill, which matched well with the Nixon Administration’s stated 
preferences,239 with a much tougher Senate bill.  
As discussed in this Subpart, a major hurdle for the conference committee 
became clear as pressure from the White House, mediated by the House 
conferees and actions of Administration officials, threatened to eliminate the 
Senate bill’s strict one-year automotive emissions reduction deadline provision 
and economic cost inconsideration. The Senate conferees’ effort was guided 
primarily by Muskie, whose uncompromising position dominated the 
conference outcome. Still recognizing the contributions of other Subcommittee 
members, Billings later remembered that Muskie “challenged his colleagues in 
committee, on the floor, and in conference to defend anything less than forcing 
technology to achieve healthy air by a date standard. None did.”240 Leon 
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Billings’ recollections provide much color and insight into the conference 
committee process that may be otherwise absent in the available documentary 
history, and his characterization of the events are considered here to craft a 
narrative of the conference proceedings. 
In contrast to his efforts to seemingly bend over backwards to create 
consensus on the Subcommittee, Muskie’s unwillingness to compromise in the 
conference made him a perennial obstacle to those who wanted to change the 
legislation in such a way that he believed might weaken it. Illustrating the 
Administration’s position, and demonstrating Muskie’s prominent ability to 
shelter the bill from weakening, John Whitaker wrote during the conference 
process that 
The Muskie Senate version is much tougher with some real questions as to 
whether the automobile companies can meet the standards for automobile 
emissions required by the bill. 
. . . . 
The Administration [can] make no attempt to soften the Senate Bill in 
Conference because if we publicly oppose the bill, we will be hurt politically 
by being “too soft on pollution” and in Dick Cook’s view, [it] won’t affect 
the outcome anyway.241  
The culmination of the Subcommittee’s work to force technology for the 
public interest, the 1975 auto emissions standard in many ways became the 
sticking point in the conference.242 As “[i]ndustry cried foul, . . . demanded 
hearings, [and] several groups suggested that the bill would put them out of 
business,”243 it became the key decision of the conference.244  
Statutory standards offered stronger congressional control and minimized 
the risk of administrative equivocation and weakening of the Act. With little 
movement happening in conference, the legislation risked being lost altogether 
should Congress adjourn without reconciling the different bills.245 In fact, some 
within the White House had been working to slow the conference process with 
the House conferees in order to kill the bill and try again next year.246 Just before 
midterm election day, a “flurry of activity” and concessions from the House 
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allowed the Senate to have their way on 1975 auto emissions, and the Title II 
standards were incorporated into the law.247 The election itself was undoubtedly 
a major factor in this period of rapid gaining of ground by Muskie and his Senate 
cohort; any House member would be tempted by the political points in their 
home districts offered by credit-taking on the motherhood issue.  
Once the conferees returned, however, and political pressure was alleviated 
by the release valve of a past election, the Senate conferees lost their momentum 
and “[n]o one could quite recall accepting Senate language and the job began all 
over again,” as Billings remembered.248 Like the more moderate House 
conferees, the 1975 auto emissions standard deadline was also the major hang-
up of the White House, despite the urging of then-CEQ Chair and future EPA 
Administrator Russell Train to accept the “extremely tough” Senate bill in order 
to avoid any potential political backlash.249  
Opposing Train, however, Secretary Richardson of Health, Education, and 
Welfare mobilized to influence House conferees,250 attempting to cut the 
stronger Senate deadline and citizen suit provisions,251 which did not exist in the 
House bill,252 thus providing cover for the Administration and allowing it to set 
its own priorities when it came time to enforce the bill. Some controversy was 
generated by the publicly-released “Richardson letter,” which threatened to out 
the White House and its attempt to curb the Clean Air Act. Richardson’s efforts 
were, in reality, part of a larger scheme orchestrated by John Whitaker, who 
hoped to make any alterations to the bill privately through work with the House, 
thus avoiding any costly public statements by the President against the popular 
bill. This strategy relied on “stiffen[ing] [the] back[s]” of the House conferees, 
particularly when it came to standing up against the Title II deadline.253 Possibly 
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caving to pressure from the Administration, House conferees maintained their 
opposition to key parts of the Senate bill.254 Muskie was furious, not only 
because everyone seemed to have “lost their memory,” but also because he 
feared it made him look foolish as he had already declared that the issue was 
settled.255  
Controversy rattled the conference as Democrat John Jarman on the House 
side was revealed in the press to have a potential conflict of interest due to his 
family’s owning auto dealerships in Oklahoma.256 The process dragged on for 
another month, and the elephant in the room of auto emissions was put off and 
neglected, similar to the way it was saved for last, as it were, even during the 
committee process.257 One morning session, the House appeared to finally take 
a definitive stand on 1975 standards, and offered their ultimatum: an amendment 
that would provide for unlimited extensions of the 1975 statutory standards 
deadline. This, they hoped, would give the auto industry room to continue 
business as usual without threat of total collapse, while still granting the Senate 
the standards in the Act itself.258 
At this point, Muskie and the Senate conferees could have folded and 
acquiesced earlier arguments about keeping the extension and conditions for it 
as narrow as possible.259 However, because the terms of the amendment 
proposed were anathema to the policy goals of the Subcommittee, the Senate 
conferees refused the offer and Muskie considered a compromise, ordering 
Senate staff to formulate alternatives to be presented in a caucus meeting during 
recess.260 Billings (who also acted as a negotiator in the conference 
committee),261 Jorling, and the ten other Senate staff members presented four 
alternatives.262 As Billings recalled, the debate was “turgid” and conferees were 
tired, largely unresponsive, and confused about what the staff was proposing in 
terms of new technical proposals.263  
In huddle, some Senate conferees now seemed to have been willing to 
accept a compromise and change their original position to a more moderate one, 
and each of the four proposed alternatives would have provided an additional 
one-year deadline extension beyond the Senate’s one-year extension.264 This 
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seemed to Muskie in particular, however, to provide too much leeway to the 
executive branch, which violated a core principle of nondelegation driving the 
Act’s intent to strip enforcement discretion from the Act.265 
However, Billings gave credit to Muskie alone at this critical juncture for 
urging the Senate conferees to maintain their original position. Faced with the 
additional deadline extension, Muskie insisted, by Billings’ colorful 
characterization:  
Well, god dammit, I’m not going to go in the House and propose that we gut 
the goddamn bill. And I don’t think anybody in this conference committee is 
going to go in there and tell the House that we want to gut the goddamn bill. 
What have you guys been doing for the last two hours?266  
Billings also recalled Muskie as also saying concerning substantive 
concessions,  
I will not accept that—I will not accept a deadline extension beyond the 
Senate bill. The Senate has called for a deadline of 1975 and giving the 
automobile industry an additional year if they can prove that the [emission 
control technology] does not exist. Anything beyond that is unacceptable and 
I think the country ought to be so informed.267  
Backs stiffened, Senate conferees rallied behind Muskie and agreed eight 
to zero to support their original bill.268 Not even moderate Committee Chair 
Jennings Randolph, who “would have killed for that extra year,” voiced 
opposition.269 By one account offered by Billings, at this point an unnamed staff 
person turned to Muskie and said that “that killed the bill,” insisting that the 
House would put the brakes on the whole process.270 “[T]hen let the bill die,” 
Muskie responded, “this is the public issue . . . this is what the public expects 
and this is what the public should get or there will be no bill at all.”271 
Returning to the full conference committee that same day, the Senate re-
upped its adamancy and refusal to compromise as Muskie offered the 
compromise, which was, in Billings’ words, something along the lines of “if you 
guys can’t accept our proposition, we’ll see you next year.”272 Despite its earlier 
 
 265. Interview with William Ruckelshaus, supra note 122 (“One of the ways of reading the Clean Air Act 
is an expression of lack of faith in the executive branch by the legislative branch. They lock you into these 
standards and time frames in which you must hit them. Essentially saying, ‘We’ll do that. Your job is to enforce 
what we have already done. You can grant them one year then they have to come back to us.’ To me, that is a 
useful way to read the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act—an expression of a lack of trust of the executive 
branch by the legislative branch.”). 
 266. Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57, at 14 (quoting Sen. Edmund Muskie (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). Billings and others insist that Muskie was no stranger to colorful language, and so there is 
reason to believe that this characterization of Muskie’s mannerisms may not be too far off the mark. 
 267. Memorandum from Leon Billings, supra note 1, at 3 (quoting Sen. Edmund Muskie) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 268. Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57; see also Memorandum from Leon Billings, supra note 1, 
at 3. 
 269. Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57, at 14. 
 270. Memorandum from Leon Billings, supra note 1, at 3. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57. 
940 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:901 
hesitancy to accept the strict statutory deadlines and standards, the House 
delegation voted to accept the Senate terms, later reporting to the full House that 
this change was the “[b]ig difference” from what they had passed earlier.273  
The Senate, Muskie most of all, could claim victory on the core issue of 
the Clean Air Act, later claiming it “no less” than the Senate bill on key issues.274 
Despite equivocation from some other Senators and staff members throughout 
the conference process, Muskie recognized the political necessity of the rigid 
deadline pushed initially by Eagleton. Returning to the Senate, he emphasized 
this victory and seemed to take a victory lap, stating, “[t]he deadline has been 
retained. That deadline is January 1, 1975, for carbon monoxide and 
hydrocarbons, and January 1, 1976, for oxides of nitrogen. I repeat, that deadline 
has been retained.”275 
Interestingly, both chambers of Congress viewed Muskie and the Senate’s 
bill in conference as “tougher,” and saw the Senate conferees in the position of 
fending off compromises that might weaken the bill. Muskie was mentioned by 
name and credited with protecting the heart of the Act, even in the House. “A 
number of us attempted to amend H.R. 17255 to include [a statutory 1975 
deadline] when it was before the House of Representatives in June of this year. 
We were narrowly defeated; however, Senator Muskie was successful in the 
Senate.”276 He is celebrated for fending off perceived attacked from industry “as 
espoused by the administration.”277 Similarly, he was commended “without 
restraint” by a co-conferee during Senate consideration.278 Counter-intuitively, 
one element of the bill, which made it so “tough,” was the result of the House’s 
contributions in conference; although the Senate bill was the primary mold after 
which the final Act was patterned, the House contributed language increasing 
the role of the federal government in section 110.279 
Other Representatives doubled down on taking the Senate’s side, calling 
the House’s efforts “inadequate—a half step where 10 giant steps were 
required,” and recognizing the “the much stronger provisions of the Senate-
passed Clean Air Act amendments.”280 The House conferees were generally 
lauded in their own chamber of Congress only insofar as they acquiesced and 
laid down to the Senate: “I want to commend the House conferees for agreeing 
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to accept the stronger Senate-passed provisions in so many cases,” 
Representative Vanik of Ohio stated, closing the record and adding to the House 
chorus of praise for the Senate in general and Muskie in particular. “Their 
action,” Vanik said, “and the action of the Congress in passing this bill will be—
next to solving the dread disease of cancer—the single most important thing that 
the Congress can do to improve the health of the American people.”281 
With the agreement of the conferees secured and the conference committee 
results presented to both chambers of Congress, the bill moved next to an 
increasingly tense and skeptical White House. Months of anxious memos from 
competing factions within the White House urging the President to either accept 
or reject the bill were coming to a head, and Nixon’s commitment to hang on to 
the environmental boat and stay competitive with Muskie would undergo its first 
major test. 
B. SIGNING AND THE “MUSKIE BROUHAHA”  
As 1971 grew nearer, pressure mounted, and anxiety of a potential pocket 
veto peaked. As questions about the fate of the bill loomed, Senator Cooper and 
Committee Chair James Randolph, decided to go to the White House in an effort 
to convince President Nixon to sign the bill.282 While there are no official notes 
of what transpired between the two in their meeting, the Clean Air Act was, of 
course, signed. Billings believes that Cooper played an “instrumental” role in 
lobbying the President to get the bill signed before the end of year deadline.283 
Regardless, this episode demonstrates the persistent efforts of the Subcommittee 
to see the bill through. 
Even before conference committee began, some within the Administration 
were equivocating on earlier resistance and seemed willing to accept whatever 
bill was presented, despite an earlier resolve to weaken it.284 At this time, 
Ruckelshaus, new to his post as the first EPA Administrator, seized on the 
opportunity to put pressure on Nixon. In a public statement, Ruckelshaus lauded 
bipartisan cooperation and the results of the conference committee and 
expressed that he was pleased to see far-reaching proposals like those which 
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Nixon sent to Congress in February accepted,285 thereby whittling away at any 
window of opportunity the President might have had to divorce himself from the 
bill and justify a pocket veto.286  
Ruckelshaus also implicitly endorsed the citizen suit provision by 
discussing the role of individual citizens, and chided Congress for not working 
quickly enough on a water bill.287 Russell Train, although he differed from 
Ruckelshaus and explicitly lobbied against the citizen suit provision, still pushed 
for the administration’s support of the bill, insisting that it was more or less what 
Nixon wanted anyways, despite being “extremely tough,” and holding that 
signing it would give Nixon some leverage against Muskie on the 
environment.288 Even the Office of Management and Budget, the de facto rival 
of the Train-led environmental faction in the Nixon White House, accepted the 
bill over the prospect of a re-do the following year.289 Although Nixon and many 
in his administrations were wont to cite the potentially deleterious effects of 
environmental regulation on jobs and industry, the particulars of the Act were 
also explicitly supported by the AFL-CIO, as well.290 
After almost managing to avoid signing the Act by strange circumstances 
and a final back-stiffening, Nixon was ready to put the Clean Air Act behind 
him.291 Even after deciding to sign the bill, Nixon leveraged the opportunity for 
political points and opted to exclude Muskie from the ceremony.292 Staff 
reported that Nixon did not want Muskie “hogg[ing] the cameras,”293 and the 
White House generally tried to move on from what one staffer termed the 
“Muskie brouhaha.”294 It is worth commenting that while it would be impossible 
to know Nixon’s intentions at the time, he was clearly by no means anxious to 
get the Clean Air Act signed as soon as possible, as his previous rhetoric on the 
environment may have indicated. Muskie, as it turns out, was home for the 
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holidays anyway, and would have been unavailable for the signing.295 
Nonetheless, Nixon succeeded in signaling his political stance. 
IV.  ENFORCEMENT AND OVERSIGHT 
As President Nixon signed the Clean Air Act into law at the very close of 
1970, it was not altogether clear what its practical effect would be. Although the 
language passed by Congress was made up of largely clear and concise 
language, how well the Act would be administered and interpreted would make 
all the difference in determining whether the air would be any cleaner by the end 
of the “decade of the environment.” 
Efforts to undermine the Clean Air Act grew in the coming years as the 
environmental thrust dimmed and the Arab Oil Crisis flared.296 Just four months 
after his hesitant signing of the Clean Air Act, Nixon sat in his office with auto 
executives to tell them, “I’m just telling you my personal views. . . . [V]iews are, 
are, are frankly, uh, whether it’s the environment or pollution or Naderism or 
consumerism, are extremely pro-business. Uh, we are fighting, frankly, a[nd] 
delaying action in many instances.”297 
It is in this highly contrarian environment of the Nixon Administration that 
enforcement of the Clean Air Act would have to occur. The first two 
Administrators of the EPA, Ruckelshaus and Train, were pitted in the middle of 
the environmental fight as it was raging at its closest to the President. Without 
considering what was at risk politically, any study of EPA enforcement decisions 
in the 1970s lacks color and depth; thus, we hope to put the early EPA in context 
of an evolving political atmosphere. 
Part IV.A investigates the role of the EPA’s first Administrator, William 
Ruckelshaus, in becoming a “sheriff” and enforcer of environmental law and 
clean air deadlines, giving the EPA ethos as “the gorilla in the closet.” Part IV.B 
follows through the service of the EPA’s second Administrator, Russell Train, 
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fresh from the Council on Environmental Quality, as he fended off 
Administration efforts to weaken the Act by exempting energy generation from 
regulation, permitting unfiltered tall stacks, and allowing significant 
deterioration of air quality in attaining areas. Although they offered different 
leadership styles, the tenure of both Administrators complemented one another 
and were critical in establishing a legitimate and binding Clean Air Act 
enforcement regime. The role of congressional oversight by key players in the 
Senate Public Works Committee is maintained throughout this Part, along with 
references to key decisions by the judiciary that affected EPA programs. 
A. KEEPING THE GORILLA IN THE CLOSET: WILLIAM RUCKELSHAUS 
In its first years of operation, largely due to the efforts of its first 
Administrator, the EPA sought a reputation of being “fair but firm.”298 This 
image was beneficial for Nixon, who himself publicly framed William 
Ruckelshaus as “a fair crusader . . . for clean air, for clean water, and a better 
environment for all Americans” at his swearing-in.299 Ruckelshaus, from his first 
press conference as Administrator of the EPA, however, publicly leaned towards 
a “tough” image, using language which fostered an image as a sort of sheriff of 
pollution: “We see the Environmental Protection Agency’s primary 
responsibility as enforcement. . . . [A]nd we are going after the polluters.”300 A 
tough stance was necessary: the EPA was battling the same public cynicism of 
government that had forced the strong statute through Congress in the first place, 
and Ruckelshaus was given the Herculean task of convincing the public that the 
Republican Administration could respond to the public over industry 
pressures.301 
He even broke from Nixon’s preferred method of discussing the 
environment and pollution by specifically citing industry as a serious polluter.302 
However, at the time Ruckelshaus was speaking, the EPA was armed with very 
little, having only been created a half-year before; furthermore, policy tools and 
 
 298. OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT & GEN. COUNS., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE FIRST 
TWO YEARS: A REVIEW OF EPA’S ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 2 (1970); see also JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT 
AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES 22 (2012). 
 299. President Richard M. Nixon, Remarks at the Swearing in of William D. Ruckelshaus as Administrator 
of the Environmental Protection Agency (Dec. 4, 1970), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-
the-swearing-william-d-ruckelshaus-administrator-the-environmental-protection. 
 300. Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec’y, The White House Press Conference of William 
D. Ruckelshaus, Assistant Attorney Gen., and Russell E. Train, Chairman, Council on Envtl. Quality 2 (Nov. 6, 
1970) (on file with authors as Nixon 1-9). 
 301.  Interview with William Ruckelshaus, supra note 122, at 5, 7 (“That overall attitude and this cynicism 
about government that was fed by the Vietnam war were running so deep among so many people. . . . We had 
to show them that the government was in fact concerned about their health and about the environment, and that 
we would take action where necessary to ensure that their health was protected”). 
 302. Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec’y, supra note 300, at 5 (“[I]ndustry is one of the 
problems.”). 
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staff aside, Ruckelshaus himself did not have formal management education.303 
Still, Ruckelshaus remembers being “excited and very energized” to seize on 
Clean Air and legitimize the new independent agency.304  
The first step taken in translating the Clean Air Act took the form of 
preliminary investigation to determine the state of compliance under previous 
iterations of the law. Requests for emission levels at existing facilities were 
coupled with some stack tests and the first notices of violation of auto pollution 
standards.305 The Clean Air Act provided the EPA with some of its first exercises 
in developing coherent national infrastructure.306 Having been built out of the 
scraps of fifteen disparate agencies,307 the new agency would have to create 
necessary structures to study, monitor, permit, regulate, and litigate pollution 
based explicitly on statutory mandate. Needless to say, the first two years of the 
EPA were formative and would do much to define the overall trajectory of the 
agency in terms of reputation, legitimacy, and organization.308 
Legitimizing the mission of the EPA was made especially difficult by the 
fact that, even at the time the Clean Air Act was passed, it seemed likely that the 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) established in Title I, in 
addition to the ninety percent pollution reduction standard of Title II, would be 
difficult, if not impossible, to meet by the set deadline of 1975 or 1976.309 
Moreover, unlike prior air and water pollution laws, the new Clean Air Act 
required a degree of federal coordination and regional specialization that did not 
yet exist.310 
The Clean Air Act’s State Implementation Plan (SIP) structure, the 
practical outcome of Muskie’s vision of shared federalism, necessitated 
relationship-building with state environmental regulatory agencies, which at 
times pushed back against the federalization of pollution control, seeing 
themselves in part as defenders of regional industry productivity, while still 
building a federal “enforcement presence.”311 The “tough” reputation that the 
 
 303. Interview with William Ruckelshaus, supra note 122, at 3 (“And, I had so little management experience 
at the time. . . . One of our people, named Howard Messner, who has since died, brought in an organizational 
chart and said, ‘Now, you move these boxes around wherever you think they ought to go.’ I said, ‘I have never 
seen an organizational chart before. How the hell would I know where these boxes go?’”). 
 304. Id. at 2.  
 305. MINTZ, supra note 298, at 26 (“EPA initiated information-gathering procedures, including . . . a limited 
number of stack tests. The Agency issued its first formal notices of violation and administrative orders to 
identified sources of air pollution and began to enforce the limitations on automobile-generated pollution” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 306. Arguably, the EPA laid the groundwork for a reputation of enforcement with water regulation under 
the Refuse Act. Id. at 22. The EPA garnered publicity, for example, by concentrating efforts and holding 
conferences in major cities. Id. 
 307. Interview with William Ruckelshaus, supra note 122, at 3. 
 308. MINTZ, supra note 298, at 23 (“For many participants in EPA’s newly established enforcement 
program, the first two years were an intensely exciting yet a hectic time. . . . The Agency’s first two years were 
a formative time for its enforcement programs.”). 
 309. See Interview with William Ruckelshaus, supra note 122. 
 310. See MINTZ, supra note 298, at 26. 
 311. Id. at 36. 
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EPA had worked to achieve, in addition to the comprehensive nature of the 
Clean Air Act and Ruckelshaus’ publicized intention to enforce it, resulted in 
many state pollution control agencies viewing the EPA as “unnecessarily 
stringent and overly aggressive.”312 Even in the absence of any antagonistic 
relationship with the states, a lack of experience resulted in many cases in 
unspecific and uninformed SIP preparation, and EPA staff was forced to 
dedicate much of its labor and efforts to reviewing individual facilities’ 
compliance schedules and micromanaging pollution emissions.313 
Thus, it was necessary for Ruckelshaus to manage the development of a 
national regulatory framework that could execute the mandates of the Act while 
still fostering buy-in from the ten separate administrative sub-regions. Without 
such a framework laid out while the Act was still in vogue (that is, before anti-
environmental tendencies became more entrenched among conservative 
politicians), reasonable enforcement of the Clean Air Act would have needed to 
come into being with much greater external political resistance; without the 
momentum Ruckelshaus provided by striking while the iron was still hot, a 
successful program would have been much less feasible. 
Ruckelshaus’ most outstanding decision, certainly bolstering the integrity 
of the Clean Air Act, was his May 1972 decision to deny the auto industry’s 
request for a one-year extension of the 1975 auto standards on the grounds that 
the unavailability of the necessary technology was not sufficiently 
demonstrated. Despite the political pressure and efforts by industry to sway the 
agency, Ruckelshaus remained convinced that the deadline could be met.314 By 
taking a stand on the 1975 deadlines, Ruckelshaus proved that the Clean Air Act 
could have real effects on industry, and that the theory of technology forcing 
was more than statutory postulation. The agency was going to show itself, as 
Ruckelshaus put it, as a true “gorilla in the closet.”315 
This is not to say, however, that the EPA, even under the leadership of 
Ruckelshaus, executed the newly legislated environmental will of the legislature 
flawlessly or without some struggle exerted by congressional oversight. 
Congress continually asserted its role in keeping the EPA in line, pulling on the 
opposite end of the rope as the conservative and incrementalistic White House. 
The Public Works Committee, in particular, sought to keep the EPA and its 
leadership close and maintain something of a working relationship; Ruckelshaus 
recalled Senators Muskie and Baker as being particularly responsive to his 
concerns and willing to co-sponsor proposed amendments.316  
 
 312. Id. at 24. 
 313. Id. at 26–27 (“Once the SIPs became enforceable, EPA devoted a good deal of its staff’s time to 
determining how to apply these requirements to the numerous industrial and municipal sources that caused 
pollution. . . . The Agency also reviewed the acceptability of proposed SIP compliance schedules for many 
individual facilities.”). 
 314. See Interview with William Ruckelshaus, supra note 122. 
 315. Id.  
 316. Id. (“But, from time to time, I would bring up issues to [Muskie]; he would be responsive to them.”). 
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Still, the Committee was not afraid to slap the wrists of the EPA when it 
felt necessary; after all, the Senate was skeptical of the administration and its 
alleged long-term commitment to the environment. In 1971 and 1972, Ed 
Muskie’s Air and Water Pollution Subcommittee acted as the primary vehicle 
for oversight and, in some instances, a rebuke of the EPA when it failed to meet 
Congress’ lofty expectations.317 Beginning even with the Act’s passage, Muskie 
and Eagleton announced their intentions to be vigilant concerning the 
administration of the legislation, citing the administration’s resistance to the 
Senate bill and the Richardson letter.318 
Muskie in particular sought to ensure that the “spirit of the law” was 
observed, and that the EPA would not make unnecessary concessions to the auto 
industry or place undue costs on the consumer.319 The Senate accused the 
Administration’s “hesitancy to enforce the Clean Air Act” to be “abetting” the 
industry attack, implicating Ruckelshaus and drawing a through-line to Nixon’s 
meetings in late 1969 to supposedly make a deal putting off auto emissions 
regulation and “permit dirty cars for ten years.”320 Even the arguable magnum 
opus of Ruckelshaus’ Clean Air Act administration, refusing the 1975 standards 
deadline extension, was criticized by the Senate as being a “superficially tough 
stance,” which was undermined or reversed by what the Subcommittee saw as 
unpublicized actions to the detriment of the Act.321  
Even in the face of some Congressional rebuke, Ruckelshaus was, in the 
view of Train, ultimately “respected in Congress” in addition to being “well-
liked by the environmental community . . . display[ing] enough independence to 
please the public and keep the White House a bit nervous.”322 Later scholars 
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concluded that it may have been the “glare of intense publicity” which aided 
Ruckelshaus in kicking enforcement measures into second gear.323 
Still, congressional oversight alone was not always enough to overcome 
the massive political forces weighing on the EPA, and at times, the courts were 
forced to intervene and mandate action in the spirit of the Committee’s 
intentions. 
Judge Malcolm Wilkey, of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals,324 captured 
this trend in powerful language in 1976 when he asserted that “recent history 
would indicate that the prime mover behind implementation of the Clean Air 
Act has not been Congress or EPA, but the courts—specifically this court.”325 
As evidence of his point, Judge Wilkey cited Ruckelshaus’ own comments in 
justification of controversial auto emissions in which the Administrator punted 
responsibility for enforcement decisions to the judiciary after NRDC v. EPA,326 
stating, “I know this is controversial, but I am under a court order and this is the 
only demonstrable way to meet the national clean air standards.”327 
Ruckelshaus also recalled this pressure from the courts in the case of court-
mandated transportation controls in Los Angeles, for example—although the 
EPA argued that it would be impossible to meet NAAQS deadlines in the area 
by the 1975 or 1976 deadline, the court nevertheless demanded that EPA 
mandate strict controls in California’s implementation plan at risk of 
contempt.328 When Ruckelshaus, in turn, announced EPA’s intentions to remove 
eighty percent of automobiles from L.A. and was met with laughter from a room 
of reporters, he shielded the agency from criticism by citing the court’s ethos: 
“It’s not a joke. It is the law and a requirement from a judge.”329 It is worth 
considering, however, that the steel in the court’s spine was likely not entirely 
its own. The drafters of the Senate bill discussed above deserve sustained credit, 
being responsible for removing excess discretion from the courts and mandating 
implementation of the Act’s standards.  
 
 323. MINTZ, supra note 298, at 23. 
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Another such case of judicial strengthening-through-interpretation of the 
Act took the form of a strong policy of antidegradation, also known as 
prevention of significant deterioration (PSD), which would prevent degradation 
of air quality conditions in areas where federal standards were already met.330 
The language of the Act itself contained no provision or mandate for the 
prevention of significant deterioration in attaining areas.331 The closest it came, 
however, to such a policy, was the language “protect and enhance” found in the 
Act’s declaration of purpose.332 
This phrasing was carried over from the 1967 predecessor legislation.333 In 
1972, Muskie publicly insisted that the EPA’s failure to adopt a non-degradation 
policy was a failure to recognize Congress’ intentions since the 1967 
amendments.334 Obligated to enforce the earlier legislation, Health, Education, 
and Welfare (HEW) promulgated rules in 1969 that recognized “air quality 
standards which, even if fully implemented, would result in significant 
deterioration of air quality in any substantial portion of an air quality region 
clearly would conflict with this expressed purpose of the law.”335  
This policy was reported to the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water 
Pollution and the House Committee of Public Health and Welfare,336 and 
congressional intent to carry over such a policy was made rather explicit, at least 
by the Senate in their report accompanying the 1970 amendments: “In areas 
where current air pollution levels are already equal to, or better, than the air 
quality goals, the Secretary shall not approve any implementation plan which 
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does not provide, to the maximum extent practicable, for the continued 
maintenance of such ambient air quality.”337 
When enforcement authority was transferred over to Ruckelshaus’ EPA, 
PSD rules were not implemented, against the wishes of the Committee,338 and 
rules were set permitting states to submit plans that would allow clean air areas 
to be degraded, so long as the plans were merely “adequate to prevent such 
ambient pollution levels from exceeding such secondary standard.”339 
In Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, however, Judge Pratt of the D.C. District 
Court ruled that the term “protect and enhance,” carried over from the 1967 
amendments, not only provided EPA with justification for antidegradation, but 
were actually grounds for the invalidation of any SIP approval which did not 
conform to antidegradation standards.340 More than a justification for such a 
policy, the prior rules, in conjunction with the Act’s text, provided an affirmative 
obligation to prevent significant deterioration, according to the court.341 The 
court further argued that “the public interest in this case strongly supports the 
legislative policy of clean air and the non-degradation of areas in which clean 
air exists.”342 The injunction provided against permitting SIPs, which would 
allow deterioration in areas of attainment, was affirmed by the Supreme Court 
on June 11, 1973 in a four-to-four vote without written opinion, and the EPA 
scrapped relevant SIPs.343 
B. SEEING THE CLEAN AIR ACT THROUGH: RUSSELL TRAIN 
After Ruckelshaus was asked by Nixon to resign from EPA in April 1973 
to take the place of J. Edgar Hoover as Acting Director of FBI, Russel Train 
moved in from the President’s Council on Environmental Quality, where he 
quickly found himself venturing into the increasingly “murky” political waters 
of environmental protection at EPA.344 His nomination was supported even by 
the hard-to-please Ed Muskie, who lauded Train’s “background and experience 
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to vigorously pursue” the job with “independence and objectivity.”345 Even 
bomb-thrower Leon Billings, who had arguably higher standards, spoke 
glowingly of Train, calling him “beyond a doubt, the most important 
environmental advocate in any administration in which I was involved,” and the 
“best administrator the EPA has ever had bar none.”346  
In fact, it was none other than the Senate Public Works Committee which 
conducted Train’s confirmation hearing, which he cleared eighty-five to zero, 
further showing their sustained oversight role.347 Train’s easy clearance of the 
Senate confirmation hearing also demonstrate his popularity in Washington. 
This popularity may have saved Train during more turbulent periods, in fact; a 
less popular Administrator may have been more expendable in the eyes of a 
desperate and tail-spinning President looking to reign in the executive. 
When Train entered the EPA, the environment’s popularity was 
backsliding, and the “honeymoon period” of the ecology movement was seen to 
have already passed by. Unlike Ruckelshaus, Train considered himself an 
environmentalist by the common understanding of the term.348 Also unlike 
Ruckelshaus, Train would be forced to wage war uphill for the EPA. The 
“[A]gency’s first chief, William Ruckelshaus, waged anti-pollution offensives 
with strong public support. Mr. Train, on the other hand, found himself 
defending the environmental movement and his agency against attack . . . . But 
Mr. Train is not giving ground easily,” the Wall Street Journal reported.349 An 
environmental reporter described the shift during Train’s time in a similar way:  
Gone are the banner, slogan days, and much of the glamour that surrounded 
a new agency born of a popular cause. Gone too is the relatively quick and 
highly visible environmental offensive that produced the early wave of 
regulation. . . . No longer was environment the golden child, the exclusive 
and favorite national concern.350 
Statutory deadlines of 1975 imposed by the Clean Air Act appeared on the 
horizon just in time for the zenith of an energy crisis which threatened to carry 
with it economic downturn in the face of trending inflation, and the White House 
no longer masked its intentions to roll back environmental regulations in green-
tinted language. Nixon needed allies in industry as his Presidency spiraled.351 
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“If the motivation for his pro-environment initiatives prior to 1973 had been 
largely political—with an eye on Muskie and on the 1972 election—as it 
probably had been, that motivation had now evaporated,” Train wrote.352 The 
primary assault on the Clean Air Act, among other environmental laws, was 
waged on the front of energy security.353 
Soon after his swearing in, for example, Train recalls being invited by 
Nixon to attend a Cabinet meeting focused on the issue of a fuel shortage 
forecast for the coming winter.354 Less available oil would necessitate 
substitutive coal burning, and Nixon indicated that he believed, being unfamiliar 
with the states’ ability to request variances, that it would be necessary to lower 
the emission standards overall.355 Train relied on the public health focus of the 
Clean Air Act generated by Muskie to stage his defense of the Act, pointing out 
the standards’ relevance to “such issues as emphysema, bronchial disorders, 
respiratory disease generally, cardiac conditions, and lung cancer.”356 Nixon 
responded by noting that “when he was young there were more cases of 
tuberculosis from cold houses than from most other causes.”357 Immediately 
following the meeting, Nixon and Energy Policy Office Director John Love held 
a meeting to call for “a relaxation of air pollution standards.”358 
In early 1974, the Nixon White House and OMB released thirteen proposed 
Clean Air Act rollback amendments, which would permanently permit tall 
smokestacks, allow consideration of economic effects and costs in standard-
setting (undoing a key aspect of technology forcing), disallow state preemption 
of weaker federal air standards, and exempt all energy production from the 
National Environmental Policy Act.  
To fight back, Train met with Nixon in an attempt to explain his point of 
view; more significantly, he took to the press to broadcast his objections and 
undermine Nixon’s rollback strategy. The New York Times reported on the issue 
in an article dramatically titled “White House Challenged by Environmental 
Chief,” which quoted Train stating, “I want it known that I am strongly opposed 
to most of these proposals, and I am going to fight them to the last wire, because 
I don’t think they are necessary and I do think they’d do substantial harm,” even 
calling the proposed NEPA exemption a kind of “designed emasculation,” which 
he “bitterly opposed.”359 Elsewhere, Train doubled down and indicated that he 
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believed he had made his opposition to many of the rollback amendments “pretty 
damn clear.”360 
Although Nixon’s stance was less clear in 1970, by this point the Times 
openly discussed “the President’s well‐known opposition to important segments 
of the Clean Air Act when it was passed. At that time, it was said by White 
House sources that he came close to vetoing the bill.”361 Should the fight be 
litigated before Congress, the Times stated, Train “will have aggressive allies in 
Senator Edmund S. Muskie, the Maine Democrat who is chairman of the Senate 
subcommittee on environmental pollution, and several of his colleagues.”362 
Muskie’s looming presence in the Senate, although no longer sufficient to 
force the hand of the White House through the threat of political competition, 
was nevertheless a sustained force for backing Train’s EPA as the two fended 
off political attacks on the EPA and the Clean Air Act. Train was supported by 
the Senate Public Works Committee, with which Train said “it would have been 
impossible to have a more supportive relationship,”363 singling out Howard 
Baker, Jennings Randolph, and Ed Muskie in particular, who had become a close 
friend of Train’s.364 Without both men, it is feasible that the Clean Air Act would 
have succumbed to the political vortex of the energy crisis.365 
The proposed rollback amendments eventually sent to Congress were 
successfully trimmed back by Train’s public adamance,366 and Muskie publicly 
ceded credit to Train for “blocking some planned anti-pollution rollbacks.”367 
The intentions of the Act were protected, including the EPA’s commitment to 
permanent pollution control technology in the form of smokestack scrubbers, 
which would become an integral part of the implementation of the Clean Air Act 
for stationary sources,368 and another example of the Act’s technological forcing 
capabilities.369 
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Train would be fated to fight the same battle against energy-driven 
rollbacks again against Ford, who nearly resubmitted virtually the same set of 
rollback proposals to Congress the following October.370 In the Ford White 
House, Train faced a constant battle against the Clean Air Act from others close 
to the President.371 Interestingly, though, disputes with the White House were 
reported by the Wall Street Journal as “improving Mr. Train’s standing with his 
[EPA] troops,”372 who were generally young, enthusiastic environmentalists 
with ideological commitment to the mission of the agency.373 
Train and the Muskie Subcommittee would later join forces again to 
oppose Utah Senator Frank Moss’ proposed Administration-backed amendment 
to the Clean Air Act, which would have postponed promulgation of any EPA 
regulations pending further study.374 By Train’s evaluation, the EPA, with the 
assistance and perpetual presence of the Committee, never lost a major battle in 
the fight of energy versus the environment, despite the political forces pointed 
against them.375 
Much as was the case with Ruckelshaus’ tenure, the courts also influenced 
the administration of the Act by EPA under Train. Of primary concern during 
Train’s time at the EPA was the issue of cost consideration, given the 
extenuating economic and technical circumstances of the recession and oil 
crisis.376 After years of the Nixon and Ford Administrations unsuccessfully 
working to amend the Clean Air Act to include cost consideration in SIP review, 
the issue of cost considerations was brought before the courts in 1976,377 when 
three coal-fired power plants in the non-attaining St. Louis area petitioned the 
D.C. Circuit Court for relief, alleging that compliance was impossible.378 In 
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response, the court held that “claims of economic and technological infeasibility 
could not properly provide a basis for the Administrator’s rejecting a plan.”379 
Taken to the Supreme Court, the petitioners from St. Louis similarly found 
no relief, and the EPA’s explicit lack of consideration to economic costs was 
upheld.380 By asserting that “Congress intended claims of economic and 
technological infeasibility to be wholly foreign to the Administrator’s 
consideration of a state implementation plan,”381 Justice Thurgood Marshall’s 
opinion ratified Congress’ intentions and did much to resolve the language of 
the Act and correct the conclusions of the Circuit courts in earlier years. Thus, 
“[t]he decision in Union Electric Co. v. EPA affirmed the states’ authority to set 
economically or technically infeasible emission limitations where necessary to 
achieve NAAQSs.”382  
Still, and despite tangential issues resulting from the decision that 
complicated enforcement procedures,383 Union represented a qualified victory 
and a recognition of the Senate’s intent to force technology and have the Act 
applied as a means of inducing innovation and effecting demonstrable change in 
favor of the public interest by improving public health metrics.384 Without such 
 
 379. Id. at 254. 
 380. Schoenbrod, supra note 12, at 744-45; see also Forcing Technology, supra note 174, at 1713 n.3 
(“[Union] resolved a sharp division among the circuits over the treatment of claims of economic and 
technological infeasibility). Compare Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1975), aff’d, 427 U.S. 
246 (1976) and Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 509 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1975) (economic and technological 
infeasibility irrelevant to state plan approval), with St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. EPA, 508 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1975), 
vacated as moot, 425 U.S. 987 (1976), and Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 168-69 (6th Cir. 1973) 
(feasibility must be considered in state plan approval). But see Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1286, 1294 
(9th Cir. 1977) (9th Circuit ignores Union Electric; requires EPA to show SIP emission limitation “is 
economically and technologically feasible.”). 
 381. Union Elec. Co., 427 U.S. at 256. 
 382. Forcing Technology, supra note 174, at 1715; see also Schoenbrod, supra note 12, at 769 (“When the 
adopted state implementation plans imposed stronger controls on emissions than authorities were later willing 
to enforce, the state or EPA could either not enforce the controls, or write compliance schedules that allowed 
sources to postpone action or to do less than the plan required.”). But see MELNICK, supra note 16, at 216–17 
(describing that Union did not represent an unqualified victory for Train’s EPA or the intention of the Senate 
drafters, however, because Justice Marshall conceded several “safety valves,” by the characterization of 
Melnick, such as justiciability of “claims of economic or technological feasibility” by the state court, the 
consideration of feasibility in issuing administrative orders under Section 113(a) and enforcement proceedings, 
and the consideration of those same factors by the courts in determining “appropriate relief”). 
 383. For greater analysis of this issue, see MELNICK, supra note 16, at 217-20 (analyzing SIP compliance 
at district and appellate courts).  
 384. Kathleen D. Masters, “Can’t Do” Won’t Do: Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976), 1976 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 663, 669 (“Thus, the court held that it had no jurisdiction to hear the petition for review because 
Union Electric’s claim of newly discovered information was an assertion of economic and technological 
infeasibility. Recognition that the Amendments were a drastic remedy to a dire situation played a principal role 
in the subsequent analysis by the Supreme Court. The Court read the Amendments and their legislative history 
to mean that Congress intended to use the Amendments to ‘take a stick to the states,’ to guarantee that air quality 
standards would be promptly attained and maintained. It noted that the Amendments place strict minimum 
compliance requirements upon the states, and that these requirements are of a ‘technology-forcing character.’ 
The Court viewed the Amendments as explicitly contrived to force development of pollution control techniques 
that might appear technologically or economically infeasible at the time that the state develops its pollution 
control plan” (footnotes omitted)). 
956 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:901 
backing from the courts, the central logic of technology forcing promoted by the 
Public Works Committee, as discussed above, may have fallen apart, along with 
the efficacy of stationary source regulation under the Act.385 Thus Train, much 
like Ruckelshaus following the 1973 auto emissions controversy as cited by 
Judge Wilkey, was in a position to defer criticism of accepting overly strong 
SIPs and say, in essence, that the courts made him do it. 
As the Republican Administrations around him became increasingly 
disenchanted, Train’s second major contribution to the Clean Air Act was seeing 
through what Ruckelshaus began in the form of holding industry to strict 
deadlines, which created financial pressure on industry to innovate. Because 
Ruckelshaus denied the Title II deadline extension the previous year, and 
because the deadlines were set in 1975, the auto industry was effectively forced 
to stick with the emissions control technology in development at the time—the 
catalytic converter—with the blessing of Train.386 Although neither the Clean 
Air Act nor EPA mandated any particular auto technology, the catalytic 
converter was presented by automakers as the sole frontrunner technology able 
to meet the Act’s statutory auto emissions standards.387 
The catalytic converter was no ace in the hole, however. Rare metals 
required for the new gadget were difficult to source and could be neutralized by 
leaded gas. Furthermore, evidence began to emerge in September 1973 that the 
converters produced unknown amounts of potentially harmful sulfuric acid 
vapor.388 Eric Stork, leading the “mobile sources” pollution office of the EPA 
air quality program, warned of the dangers posed by such a technology as well 
as the emissions generated by catalytic converters on a commercial scale.389  
At this juncture, Train was forced to make the difficult decision between 
taking the risk on catalytic converters or abandoning them, thereby acquiescing 
on the Clean Air Act’s Title II deadline and the deadline extension denial of his 
predecessor. Allowing EPA to save face, Congress passed the Energy Supply 
and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, which punted the deadlines until 
1977 and offered a similar one-year deadline extension.390 Train granted the one-
year extension due to latent concerns over the sulfuric acid emissions posed by 
the catalytic converter. Although there was emerging evidence that any 
emissions were sufficiently small as to pose no real health threat, testimony 
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provided at the deadline hearings gave reason to doubt earlier evaluations.391 
Train considered the decision to commit to the catalytic converter, in concert 
with the deadline extension, the correct one, despite backlash from the 
environmental community.392 
Despite granting industry an extension in 1974, Train’s decision on the 
auto emissions issue represents no less authority or captaincy than Ruckelshaus’ 
analogous decisions a few years prior. By maintaining a tough stance and 
publicly advocating for the Act’s standards, also allowing Congress to take 
responsibility for the deadlines, Train demonstrated that the EPA could balance 
risks effectively in consideration of the public health. 
In 1972, Ruckelshaus showed that the Clean Air Act and the EPA could be 
tough. A few years later, Train needed to show that it could balance discretion 
with adamance as the EPA’s bureaucratic structure evolved and further matured 
under his leadership. As wide political buy-in was diminished, caution became 
increasingly important to prevent broad political backlash against the still-young 
EPA and Clean Air Act. By the end of his tenure, Train’s dedication to the Act 
and EPA’s mission in general were hardly in question, however. Even “Ralph 
Nader admitted having been mistaken in questioning whether [Train] . . . had the 
requisite toughness for the job.”393 Both Administrators deserve unqualified 
credit in making the Clean Air Act through their tireless work and leadership. 
CONCLUSION 
As we look back at the Clean Air Act on its fiftieth anniversary, it is easy 
to argue that it represents one of the most important environmental laws in the 
history of the United States and a watershed moment in the development of 
federal environmental law. This assessment rings true when we consider its 
impact on our physical environment and on human communities historically 
afflicted by polluted air. As Senator Muskie said before the Senate, “we all must 
recognize that the quality of our air is most valuable, most essential, to the 
quality of our environment and to the quality of our lives upon this planet.”394  
We might also credit the Clean Air Act as a first step of the modern 
federalization of environmental law and, in many ways, the foundation upon 
which the field of environmental law would emerge. Whereas Muskie’s point 
was to help focus on the deterioration of the air that would have been familiar to 
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Americans at the time, we today might similarly point to the improvements in 
air quality since the passage of the Clean Air Act in retrospect.  
As a measure of our appreciation of the enactment, however, we ought to 
take time to recognize the key players who made it a reality. Senator Baker 
expressed his feelings on the Clean Air Act nearly thirty-five years after its 
passage, speaking on the accomplishments of the Senate Public Works 
Committee achieved through the Act’s passage:  
We triggered a global change. As a result of our investment and the collective 
effort of a few committed men who gathered in a small committee meeting 
room, we charted a change in the course of history.  
. . . .  
Special interests today can weaken the law. They can change the law. But in 
the final analysis they won’t roll back the continued commitment worldwide 
to emission reductions which we initiated 35 years ago.395  
Many people responsible for the global shift created by the Clean Air Act, 
including Senator Baker, have often been unfortunately overlooked, but, to the 
extent that the Clean Air Act is worth celebrating at its golden anniversary, our 
celebration should honor the legacies of those who made it what it is today. The 
Air and Water Pollution Subcommittee in full, its staff, Administrators 
Ruckelshaus and Train, and many within the Nixon Administration have earned 
a place in the narrative of the making of the Clean Air Act. 
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